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It was initiated by Ralph (Skip) Luken and written by Lyman H. Clark. The Appendix was
prepared by Margaret H. Miller. The authors would like to thank the many economists in EPA’s
program offices who assisted with this report.I am pleased to forward the enclosed report, “EPA’s Use of Benefit-Cost Analysis:
1981-1986.” This report, prompted by an initial GAO analysis, discusses the contributions that
benefit-cost analysis has made to EPA’S regulatory process and examines the limitations of
benefit-cost analysis as well. It analyzes the various statutory provisions that affect EPA’s use of
these analyses in regulatory decision making. Finally, it describes how EPA is working to
improve its benefit-cost analyses in the future. 
In addition to the benefit-cost analyses prepared for major rules as part of the RIA process, EPA
prepares benefit-cost analyses to accompany most other important environmental decisions.
During the 5-year period covered by this report, EPA issued about 1,000 regulations. Less than
2% of these were considered major rules requiring RIAs. EPA prepared RIAs for 15 of the 18
major rules. The other 3 were exempted by OMB because of statutory or court-imposed
deadlines. The accompanying report covers the benefit-cost analyses prepared for each of the 15
RIAs, as well as several of the analyses prepared for non-major rules.
The major findings of our study are the following:
1. Analysis improves environmental regulation.
EPA’s benefit-cost analyses have resulted in several cases of increased net benefits to society
from environmental regulations. Three of the RIAs showed that the net benefits from-2-
recommended improvements in the regulations would exceed $10 billion. The total cost of
preparing all of the 15 RIAs studied was approximately $10 million. Thus, our analyses
yielded a return on investment of 1,000 to 1.
2. Benefit-cost analysis often provides the basis for stricter environmental regulations.
Environmentalists often fear that economic analysis will lead to less strict environmental
regulations in an effort to save costs, but our study reveals that the opposite is just as often
the case. For example, the most dramatic increase in net benefits ($6.7 billion) from EPA’s
RIAs resulted from a recommendation for much stricter standards – to eliminate lead in
motor fuels.
3. Alternatively, benefit-cost analysis may reveal regulatory alternatives that achieve the
desired degree of environmental benefits at a lower cost.
Four of the analyses studied (used oil, TSCA premanufacture review, FIFRA data
requirements, and the national contingency plan) showed how less costly regulations would
achieve results equivalent to the more expensive alternatives. In two of these cases (used oil
and the national contingency plan), the analyses showed that the less costly alternatives
would lead to greater reductions in environmental risk.
4. Statutory restrictions limit EPA’s use of benefit-cost analysis for many regulations.
Many environmental statutes prevent EPA from considering costs and even some benefits
when setting environmental standards. EPA was able to consider the full implications of its
benefit-cost analyses when setting only 6 of the 15 regulations studied. EPA’S experience
shows, however, that some of the traditional statutory decision criteria, such as “health
effects thresholds” and “technical feasibility,” frequently do not provide clear distinctions for
decision making. Being able to consider the full range of benefits and costs associated with
alternative standards would enhance the information available in making these decisions.
5. The average cost of an RIA is low.
The average cost of EPA’s 15 RIAs was $685,000. This amounts to about 0.1% of the
minimum cost of a major rule over five years. (By definition, a major rule has a cost of at
least $100 million per year.)
6. EPA can improve its benefit-cost analyses by expanding the available scientific and
economic database and by following more rigorously EPA’s own guidelines for preparing
RIAs.
Only 6 of the 15 benefit-cost analyses presented a complete analysis that included monetized
estimates of the net benefits of regulatory alternatives. For many of these analyses, the
necessary scientific and/or economic data were either inadequate or unavailable. In the case
of some of the other analyses, on the other hand, EPA simply did not thoroughly carry out all
of the specific types of analyses called for in the RIA guidelines.
Over the years since EPA was founded, EPA’s use of benefit-cost analysis in environmental
rulemaking has increased considerably. While recognizing the limitations of benefit-cost
analyses, we are finding these analyses to be increasingly useful tools in helping to provide the-3-
balance required in complex regulatory decisions. We expect that this report, which we will
publish with limited distribution, will contribute to a better understanding on the part of EPA,
the regulated community, and the nation as a whole of the role of these analyses in
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EPA’s central mission is to carry out its various statutory directives to protect the nation’s
health, welfare, and environment from the risks posed by pollution. Because the nation’s
resources are limited, EPA seeks to the extent legally permitted to direct those resources towards
the actions that will produce the greatest reductions in environmental risk. Benefit-cost analysis
is one of the analytic tools that the Agency uses to help make these environmental decisions. 
Over the past 15 years, EPA’s use of benefit-cost analysis in its rulemaking activity has
increased considerably. This evolution has been driven in part by a series of executive orders
requiring regulatory analyses, and in part by a steady improvement in the analytic techniques
and data sources available to the Agency. The increasingly detailed and comprehensive
benefit-cost analyses have contributed to a better understanding, on the part of EPA, the
regulated community, and the nation as a whole, of the benefits and costs of environmental
regulations.
On April 6, 1984, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) published a review of three of
EPA’s Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs) entitled “Cost-Benefit Analysis Can Be Useful in
Assessing Environmental Regulations, Despite Limitations” (GAO Report). The GAO report
offered several recommendations for enhancing the usefulness of benefit-cost analysis in the
regulatory process. Among these recommendations was that EPA send to the Congress, “in
executive summary form, those cost-benefit analyses that cannot be used in environmental
rulemaking because of legal restrictions.”
This report, prompted in part by the GAO report, examines the contributions that
benefit-cost analyses have made and discusses their limitations as well. It analyses the various
statutory provisions that affect EPA’s use of benefit-cost analysis in regulatory decision making.
Finally, it describes how EPA is working to improve its benefit-cost analyses in the future.
Included in the appendix are executive summaries of each of the 15 benefit-cost analyses
discussed in this report.
Historical Background
EPA has been preparing analyses of environmental regulations since its inception. EPA has
prepared these analyses both to provide information essential to fulfilling its statutory
responsibilities and also to comply with executive orders. Each of the major environmental
statutes designates different factors that EPA is to consider when setting environmental
regulations. At the same time the Agency is required to provide regulatory analyses for reviewS-2
by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Beginning with the “Quality of Life” reviews
under the Nixon Administration, the requirements for review by OMB have evolved from a
relatively simple analysis of costs to the comprehensive benefit-cost analyses required for the
current Regulatory Impact Analyses. Often, the factors required for review by OMB are not the
same as those specified for consideration in the environmental statutes.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency is authorized to issue regulations under several
different Acts of Congress. Some of these laws give EPA relatively broad flexibility when
choosing which factors to consider in the decision making process. With other laws, however,
the scope of EPA’s consideration is more narrowly defined by the enabling legislation. Although
none of the environmental statutes specify an analysis of net benefits as part of the rulemaking
process, many statutes direct EPA to consider most, if not all, of the information that results
from preparing benefit-cost analyses.
President Reagan’s Executive Order 12291 of 1981 requires agencies to prepare Regulatory
Impact Analyses (RIAs) for most major regulations. Executive Order 12291 is the first such
order to designate “net benefits” as the criterion for assessing proposed regulations. In the words
of the executive order, “regulatory objectives shall be chosen to maximize the net benefits to
society,” and “regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to society
for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society.”
By using the phrase “to the extent permitted by law” to qualify the directive that agencies
consider the RIAs in their rulemaking, Executive Order 12291 recognizes that there are many
instances in which Congress has directed an agency to base its rulemaking on considerations
other than those of maximizing net benefits.
EPA’s Benefit-cost Analyses, 1981-1986
Executive Order 12291 requires EPA to prepare RIAs only for major rules, a very small
portion of EPA’s rulemaking activity. Less than two percent of the approximately 1,000
regulations issued by EPA from 1981 through 1985 were considered major rules. From February
1981 through February 1986, the period covered by this report, EPA issued 18 major rules as
proposed and/or final rules. The Agency prepared RIAs for 15 of these rules. OMB exempted
the other three major rules from the RIA requirements. In addition to the RIAs for major rules,
EPA prepared benefit-cost analyses for many non-major rules and environmental decisions.
Although the benefit-cost analyses in each of the RIAs included monetized cost estimates
and discussed the benefits of the regulations, not every benefit-cost analysis included monetized
estimates of benefits. In general, the benefit-cost analyses prepared for air and water regulations
were more likely to include monetized benefits estimates than those for other program areas.
This is because the data and analytic techniques necessary for the analysis of pollutant quantities,
exposures, and adverse effects are available more often for air and water regulations than for
some of the other regulations. Twelve of the benefit-cost analyses included estimates of changes
in exposure and/or reductions in adverse effects projected as a result of regulatory actions. Six of
these analyses traced benefit estimates completely from improved ambient conditions throughS-3
reduced exposures and adverse effects to estimates of the monetized values of the benefits and
net benefits of the regulations.
These six analyses provided EPA with direct comparisons of the benefits and costs of
regulatory alternatives. Two of these analyses (lead in fuels and NAAQS-PM) showed that more
stringent standards could lead to greater benefits for society. One analysis (surface coal mines)
showed that costs would exceed benefits for two of the three alternatives proposed. Another
(organic chemicals) revealed hitherto unnoticed inter-media pollution effects that EPA is now
taking into consideration. The remaining two analyses (iron and steel and PCBs) confirmed the
positive net benefits of the preferred regulatory alternatives.
The analyses that did not monetize net benefits typically evaluated regulatory alternatives on
the basis of cost per cancer case avoided, cost per ton of pollutant removed, or similar cost-
effectiveness measures. Although these analyses might be more appropriately termed
cost-effectiveness analyses, they are included in this report under the more general heading of
benefit-cost studies, because they compared quantified benefits with monetized costs.
Although these analyses did not provide EPA with directly comparable estimates of benefits
and costs, they were useful in showing the relationships between benefits, however measured,
and costs. Two of these analyses (used oil and national contingency plan) assisted EPA in
selecting regulatory alternatives that will result in greater environmental benefits at less cost.
Another (TSCA premanufacture review) showed how the costs of the regulation could be
reduced considerably with no significant reduction in benefits. A fourth analysis (small quantity
generators), on the other hand, showed that greater benefits could be achieved with only a small
increase in costs.
Contributions of Benefit-cost Analysis
Among the many ways that benefit-cost analyses have influenced the development of
regulations at EPA are the following:
1. Guiding the regulation’s development,
2. Adding new alternatives,
3. Eliminating non-cost-effective alternatives,
4. Adjusting alternatives to account for differences between industries or industry
segments,
5. Supporting decisions.
At times benefit-cost analysis has led to more efficient regulations by showing how more
stringent alternatives would bring about a greater reduction in pollution without a commensurate
increase in costs. In two instances (leads in fuels and small quantity generators) this led to the
adoption of regulations that were more stringent than originally contemplated. At other times the
analysis showed that the costs of more stringent regulations would be disproportional to the
expected benefits. In three instances (used oil, TSCA premanufacture review, FIFRA data
requirements) this led to the selection of less stringent regulatory alternatives that resulted in
reduced regulatory burdens without significant reductions in environmental improvement.S-4
While these improvements cannot be attributed solely to benefit-cost analysis, it is fair to say
that the analyses played major roles in bringing about the regulatory improvements. The most




RIA  Change in Regulation  of Regulations
Lead in Fuels more stringent standard, $6.7 billion
greater health and
welfare benefits
Used Oil reduced regulatory costs, $3.6 billion
greater reduction in risk
Premanufacture reduced regulatory costs, $40 million
Review no significant reduction in
effectiveness
The contributions of the benefit-cost analyses prepared by EPA go beyond individual
regulations, however. In addition to improving individual environmental regulations,
benefit-cost analyses also have increased awareness of the environmental results of EPA’s
regulations, provided a framework for comparing regulations both within a single medium and
across media, identified cross-media effects, and improved analytic techniques.
Costs of the Analyses
One issue frequently raised about the RIA process is the cost and time required to perform
the benefit-cost and other analyses required for the RIAs. The total cost of the twelve RIAs for
which cost information is available was approximately $8.1 million. The cost of each RIA
ranged from $210,000 to $2,380,000, with an average cost of approximately $675,000.
When compared with the costs of at least $100 million per year that are associated with each
major regulation, a one time cost of less than $1 million for each benefit-cost analysis seems
modest. As EPA’s experience demonstrates, benefit-cost analyses have often played major roles
in bringing about regulatory improvements worth many times the cost of the analyses. The
benefit-cost analyses summarized in this report cost approximately $10 million but were
instrumental in bringing about regulatory improvements estimated at over $10 billion. This
would be equivalent to a return on investment of over 1,000 to 1.S-5
Limitations of Benefit-cost Analysis
Benefit-cost analysis and the RIA process have been subject to considerable scrutiny since
Executive Order 12291 was issued. The GAO report pointed to a number of limitations in the
three analyses it reviewed, and a number of subsequent journal articles have addressed the
subject.
In general, there are three major types of limitations discussed in these reviews:
1. Those inherent in the nature of economic analyses in general,
2. Those caused by gaps in available information and deficiencies in analytic techniques,
and
3. Those that are the result of errors and omissions in the execution of the analysis. 
EPA recognizes the importance of these limitations, addressed more fully in the body of this
report, and has taken them into consideration in the Agency’s guidelines for preparing RIAs.
Directions for the Future
Benefit-cost analysis has proven to be a useful tool not only for comparing alternatives for a
specific regulation, but also for comparing the relative value of the many different regulations
that are written in response to EPA’s various statutory authorities. Through such analyses EPA is
increasing its ability to decide how to apply the nation’s limited resources to achieve greater
levels of environmental protection, not only within but across environmental media.
As the Agency’s economic analytical capability has advanced, EPA has begun to discover
limitations in some of the traditional decision criteria for setting standards. EPA’s experience
shows that these decision criteria, such as “health effects thresholds,” “margins of safety,” and
“technical feasibility,” frequently do not provide clear distinctions for decision making.
Increasingly, health effects research is finding that it is difficult to identify thresholds below
which certain pollutants pose no risk of adverse health effects. At the same time, engineering
advances are resulting in technologies that can achieve lower and lower levels of pollution, albeit
usually at higher and higher costs. When there are no identifiable health effects thresholds and
no limits to control technology, then choosing an appropriate level of control becomes a matter
of balancing the relative benefits and costs of additional levels of control.
While recognizing the limitations of analyses such as benefit-cost analyses, EPA finds these
analyses to be increasingly useful tools in helping to provide the balance required in complex
regulatory decisions. Consequently, EPA is committed to strengthening its capabilities for
performing benefit-cost analyses and to improving the research programs that provide the
underlying economic, scientific, and technical information.Chapter 1
Introduction
EPA’s central mission is to carry out its various statutory directives to protect the nation’s
health, welfare, and environment from the risks posed by pollution. Because the nation’s
resources are limited, EPA seeks to the extent legally permitted to direct those resources toward
the actions that will produce the greatest reductions in environmental risk. Benefit-cost analysis
is one of the analytic tools that the Agency uses to help make these environmental decisions.
Over the past 15 years, EPA’s use of benefit-cost analysis in its rulemaking activity has
increased considerably. This evolution has been driven in part by a series of executive orders
requiring regulatory analyses, and in part by a steady improvement in the analytic techniques
and data sources available to the Agency. The increasingly detailed and comprehensive
benefit-cost analyses have contributed to a better understanding, on the part of EPA, the
regulated community, and the nation as a whole, of the benefits and costs of environmental
regulations.
EPA’s recent benefit-cost analyses have been prepared under Executive Order 12291, issued
in February 1981. This is the first executive order to provide a formal mechanism for comparing
the benefits and costs of environmental regulations. It requires each federal agency to prepare a
Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) to accompany most major rules. Each RIA should include a
complete analysis of the benefits and costs associated with regulatory alternatives and should
calculate the net benefits of each alternative.
The benefit-cost analyses contained in each RIA fulfill multiple objectives. They articulate
how pollution damages human health, welfare, and the environment. They estimate the benefits
of reducing those damages. They estimate the costs of pollution control and the
cost-effectiveness of control alternatives. And they assess the impacts of pollution control
alternatives upon business, society, and the economy.
Benefit-cost analyses are based upon scientific research of the extent and the effects of
pollution and upon engineering studies of alternative pollution control technologies. Although
monetizing the costs of control is usually routine, monetizing the benefits of environmental
improvements is more complex. Typically, the benefits are based upon “willingness-to-pay”
estimates obtained from the revealed preferences of potentially affected individuals. These
estimates use the common metric of the dollar to answer the question: What is the value placed
on a change in well-being that results from an improvement in environmental quality? Estimates
of the net benefits of each regulatory alternative are obtained by subtracting the estimated costs
from the estimated benefits.
For each regulatory alternative, the RIAs should include not only estimates of those benefits
and costs that can be monetized, but also descriptions of health and environmental benefits that
cannot be monetized. These analyses should be accompanied by qualifications as to the accuracy1-2
of the analyses and uncertainties in the estimates, and comments on intergenerational and other
distributional considerations. The benefit-cost analyses in the RIAs are used to assess how
environmental regulations fulfill environmental, economic, and social objectives.
EPA strives simultaneously to provide the full benefit-cost analyses required by Executive
Order 12291, and to remain faithful to its statutory directives. Many of the statutes that govern
EPA define which benefit and cost factors it may consider when deciding upon regulations.
When setting standards under these statutes, EPA prepares full regulatory impact analyses, but
the Administrator considers only those portions of the analyses that the statute allows.
While recognizing these limitations, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) has praised
benefit-cost analysis as a valuable tool for improving environmental regulations. On April 6,
1984, the GAO published a report on three of EPA’s RIAs entitled Cost-Benefit Analyses Can
Be Useful in Assessing Environmental Regulations, Despite Limitations.  The GAO report
1
offered several recommendations for enhancing the usefulness of benefit-cost analysis in the
regulatory process. Among these recommendations was that EPA send to the Congress, “in
executive summary form, those cost-benefit analyses that cannot be used in environmental
rulemaking because of legal restrictions.”
2
For the first five years following the issuance of Executive Order 12291, EPA prepared 15
RIAs to accompany major rules and many similar analyses to accompany a number of non-major
rules. This report, prompted in part by the GAO report, examines the contributions that
benefit-cost analyses have made and discusses their limitations as well. It analyses the various
statutory provisions that affect EPA’s use of benefit-cost analysis in making regulatory
decisions. Finally, it describes how EPA is working to improve its benefit-cost analyses for the
future. The appendix contains executive summaries of each of the RIAs prepared by EPA for
major rules from February 1981 when Executive Order 12291 was issued through February
1986.Chapter 2
Historical Background
EPA has been preparing analyses of environmental regulations since its inception, both to
provide information essential to fulfilling its statutory responsibilities and also to comply with
executive orders. Each of the major environmental statutes designates different factors that EPA
is to consider when setting environmental regulations. At the same time, EPA must provide
regulatory analyses for review by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Beginning
with the “Quality of Life” reviews under the Nixon Administration, the requirements for review
by OMB have evolved from a relatively simple analysis of costs to the comprehensive
benefit-cost analyses required for the current RIAs. Often, the factors required for review by
OMB an not the same as those specified for consideration in the environmental statutes.
This chapter examines how the requirements for regulatory analysis have evolved and
describes the requirements of Executive Order 12291. Chapter 3 discusses how these
requirements compare with those of EPA’s enabling legislation.
Precursors of RIAs
Over the years, the scope of the regulatory analyses required by executive orders has
gradually broadened to include not only costs, but also inflation and other economic impacts,
effects on small businesses, benefits, and net benefits. Table 2-1 summarizes the history of these
regulatory analysis requirements.
Quality of Life Review
The first executive requirement for came shortly after EPA was formed. On October 5. 1971,
OMB established a formal an economic analysis of EPA’s regulations review procedure for
regulations pertaining to environmental quality, consumer protection, and occupational and
public health and safety. Known as the “Quality of Life” review, it required that a “summary
description” accompany every significant regulation, indicating the principal objectives of the
regulation, the alternatives considered, a comparison of the benefits and costs associated with the
alternatives, and the reasons for selecting the proposed alternative.
l2-2
Table 2-1
History of Regulatory Analysis
Act/Executive Order Year Title of Analysis Types of Analysis
OMB Memo 10/5/71 1971 Quality of Life Costs, Benefits
Review
Executive Order 11821 1974 Inflation Impact Costs, Benefits
Statement Inflationary Impacts
Executive Order 11949 1976 Economic Impact Costs, Benefits,
Statement Economic Impacts
Executive Order 12044 1978 Regulatory Analysis Costs, Economic
Consequences
Regulatory Flexibility Act 1980 Regulatory Impacts on Small
Flexibility Analysis Businesses
Executive Order 12291 1981 Regulatory Impact Costs, Benefits,
Analysis Net Benefits2-3
Inflation Impact Statements
President Ford’s Executive Order 11821 of November 27, 1974, required all major
regulations to be accompanied by a statement “certifying that the inflationary impact of the
proposal has been evaluated.” These statements were referred to as “Inflation Impact
Statements.”
2
In January 1975, OMB required each agency to develop criteria for determining which rules
would be considered major, as well as procedures for evaluating the inflationary impact of
proposed rules. OMB specified that these statements were to include (1) a review of the
alternatives to the proposed action, together with their probable costs, benefits, risks, and
inflationary impacts; (2) the costs associated with the recommended alternative, together with
the inflationary effects of the action on markets, consumers, and businesses; and (3) a
comparison of the benefits to be derived from the proposed action, with the estimated costs and
inflationary impacts. Costs, benefits, and economic impacts were to be quantified as much as
possible.
3
EPA responded to OMB’S directive by adopting final guidelines for Inflation Impact
Statements in April 1975. These guidelines required the analysis of the costs, benefits, risks, and
inflationary impacts of the proposed action and its alternatives. EPA emphasized that the
benefits were to be expressed first in terms of environmental improvements, and were to be
valued in dollar terms where feasible. However, EPA did point out in its guidelines that “given
the limitations in the state of the art of benefits assessment of pollution control, ...in most cases
this type of valuation will not be feasible or meaningful.”  Thus, although a discussion of
4
benefits and a comparison of benefits with costs were called for in OMB’S guidance, the
emphasis of Inflation Impact Statements was upon costs and the impact of those costs on the
economy.
Economic Impact Statements
Executive Order 11821 expired at the end of 1976. On December 31, 1976, President Ford
issued Executive Order 11949, extending the previous order for another year. This new order
also changed the title of the required analyses to that of “Economic Impact Statements.”  In
5
January 1977, EPA revised its guidelines for these analyses. The new guidelines recommended
that the title of the analyses be amended to “Economic Impact Analyses” (EIAs) to avoid
confusion with Environmental Impact Statements (EISs).  This new title was adopted by EPA,
6
but was never formalized by the executive office.
Regulatory Analysis
In March 1978, President Carter’s Executive Order 12044 replaced the Economic Impact
Statement with the Regulatory Analysis. The Regulatory Analysis was to contain a “succinct
statement of the problem; a description of the major alternative ways of dealing with the
problem that were considered by the agency; an analysis of the economic consequences of each
of these alternatives, and a detailed explanation of the reasons for choosing one alternative over
the others.” Consideration of benefits was not an explicit requirement of the analysis, but the2-4
agencies were required to consider “the direct and indirect effects of the regulation,” and to
choose the “least burdensome” alternative.
EPA responded to Executive Order 12044 by publishing final guidelines for implementation
in May 1979. The contents of the Regulatory Analyses were to include marginal
cost-effectiveness curves for each alternative, together with analyses of the economic impacts of
the proposed standard and of each alternative. An analysis of the environmental improvements
and other benefits of the proposed action was not required by Executive Order 12044 and,
accordingly, was not included in EPA’s guidelines for Regulatory Analyses.
8
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
The Regulatory Flexibility Act in 1980 added another report to the requirements for
regulatory development. It required all federal agencies to analyze the impacts of proposed
regulations on small businesses, small nonprofit organizations, and small governmental entities.
A Regulatory Flexibility Analysis is required for all actions, except those that will “not have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.”
9
Regulatory Impact Analyses
President Reagan’s Executive Order 12291 of 1981 replaced the Regulatory Analysis with
the Regulatory Impact Analysis. The RIA not only restored the consideration of benefits to the
regulatory process; but also subtly changed the emphasis of regulatory development. No longer
were agencies to choose the “least burdensome” alternative. Instead, they were directed to
choose the alternative that would maximize the “net benefits to society.”
10
As of the date of this report, all federal agencies must prepare RIAs for most major
regulations and Regulatory Flexibility Analyses, except when the Administrator, certifies there
will be no significant economic impact on small entities. These two analyses may be combined
into one report.
Executive Order 12291 is the first such order to designate “net benefits” as the criterion for
assessing proposed regulations. In the words of the executive order, “Regulatory objectives shall
be chosen to maximize the net benefits to society,”  and “Regulatory action shall not be
11
undertaken unless the potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs
to society.”  Executive Order 12291 recognizes that many environmental statutes have
12
established other criteria for setting regulations and qualifies its directive to maximize net
benefits with the phrase “to the extent permitted by law.”
Definition of “Major Rule”
To ensure that its requirements are carried out, Executive Order 12291 requires each agency
to prepare and, to the extent permitted by law, consider an RIA for every major rule. A major
rule is defined as any regulation that is likely to result in (1) an annual effect on the economy of
$100 million or more; (2) a major increase in costs or prices; or (3) significant adverse effects on2-5
competition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation, or the international competitive
position of U.S. firms.
Regulations Exempt from RIAs
The executive order provides for certain exemptions to the RIA process. Regulations that
respond to emergencies are exempt from the review schedules, but RIAs are required as soon as
is practicable. Regulations for which the RIA process would conflict with deadlines imposed by
statute or by judicial order are similarly exempt, but the RIA requirements must be followed to
the extent permitted by statutory or judicial deadlines. Finally, the Director of OMB may exempt
any class or category of regulations from any or all of the requirements, subject to the direction
of the Task Force on Regulatory Relief.
Required Contents
As specified in Executive Order 12291, the contents of each RIA must include:
1. “A description of the potential benefits of the rule, including any beneficial effects that
cannot be quantified in monetary terms, and the identification of those likely to receive
the benefits; 
2. “A description of the potential costs of the rule, including any adverse effects that cannot
be quantified in monetary terms, and the identification of those likely to bear the costs; 
3. “A determination of the potential net benefits of the rule, including an evaluation of
effects that cannot be quantified in monetary terms; 
4. “A description of alternative approaches that could substantially achieve the same
regulatory goal at lower cost, together with an analysis of the potential benefits and costs
and a brief explanation of the legal reasons why such alternatives, if proposed, could not
be adopted; and 
5. “Unless covered by the description required under paragraph (4) of this subsection, an
explanation of any legal reasons why the rule cannot be based on the requirements set
forth in Section 2 of this Order.”  
13
Although Executive Order 12291 does not explicitly require an analysis of the benefits or costs
of all of the alternatives to the proposed action, such analysis is implicit in the requirement that
the alternative with the greatest net benefits be chosen.
OMB Guidelines
In June 1981, OMB issued guidance to help federal agencies prepare RIAs. The guidance
elaborates the requirements of the executive order. Unlike the executive order, however, it




In December 1983, EPA issued its own final guidelines for performing RIAs.  These
15
guidelines expand on OMB’S guidance, especially on the statement of the need for and
consequences of the proposal, the examination of alternative approaches, the analysis of benefits
and costs. EPA’s guidelines are divided into six sections are supplemented with four appendices
and two additional guidance documents.
The six sections are:
1. schedules for OMB review,
2. stating the need for and consequences of the proposal,
3. considering alternative approaches,
4. assessing benefits,
5.  analyzing costs, and
6. evaluating benefits and costs.
The first section sets forth OMB’S analytical requirements and its schedule for regulatory
review. The remaining sections describe how the RIA is to be performed. Appendices have been
drafted to provide considerably more detail on analyzing benefits; analyzing costs, choosing
discount rates, and performing economic impact analyses. Additional guidance documents have
been drafted to provide information on how to value mortality and morbidity benefits, and case
studies have been prepared as examples of well prepared analyses. The guidelines, appendices,
and associated documents are intended to reflect the state of the art in analytic techniques and
are updated regularly.Chapter 3
Legislative Authorities Affecting Benefit-cost Analysis
By using the phrase “to the extent permitted by law” to qualify the directive that agencies
consider the RIAs in their rulemaking, Executive Order 12291 recognizes that there may be
instances in which Congress has directed an agency to base its rulemaking on considerations
other than those of maximizing net benefits.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency is authorized to issue regulations under several
different acts of Congress. These include the Clean Air Act; the Clean Water Act; the Safe
Drinking Water Act; the Toxic Substances Control Act; the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act; the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act;
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act; and the Atomic Energy Act and its
amendments, including the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act.
Some of these laws give EPA relatively broad flexibility when choosing which
considerations to include in the decision-making process. With other laws, however, the scope of
EPA’s consideration is more narrowly defined by the enabling legislation. The following
paragraphs summarize EPA’s legislative authorities and discuss the extent to which EPA is able
to consider the results of its benefit-cost analyses in its rulemaking under each act. Table 3-1
summarizes how the analyses permitted under these acts compare with the benefit-cost analyses
required under Executive Order 12291. As can be seen, although none of the environmental
statutes specifies an analysis of net benefits as part of the rulemaking process, many statutes
direct EPA to consider most, if not all, of the benefit and cost analyses that are part of
determining net benefits.
Clean Air Act
The Clean Air Act (CAA) requires EPA to issue many different types of regulations for
different types of emission sources. Depending on the source and pollutant, the Act places
l
different requirements on the rulemaking process. For some regulations, such as the primary
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), the statute explicitly speaks only of effects
of the regulation upon public health. For others, such as most emission standards for motor
vehicles and aircraft, the CAA calls for analysis of the cost of compliance. For the regulation
that controls or prohibits motor vehicle fuels, the CAA specifically requires a benefit-cost
analysis whenever the regulation is intended to protect the effectiveness of emission control
systems. 3-2
Table 3-1
Analyses Specified in EPA’s Enabling Legislation
Benefits Costs
Act/Regulation Pollution Welfare/ Compliance Cost Economic
Reduction Health Envrnmnt Costs Effctv Impacts
Clean Air Act
NAAQS - Primary X
NAAQS - Secondary X
Hazardous Air Pollutants X
New-Source Standards X * * ** ** **
Motor Vehicle Standards*** X X X X X X
Aircraft Emissions X X X X X
Fuel Standards*** X X X X
Clean Water Act
Private Treatment Works X **** X X X
Public Treatment Works X
Safe Drinking Water Act
Max. Contaminant Level Goals X
Maximum Contaminant Levels X X
Toxic Substances Control Act X X X X X X





Reportable Quantities X X




Minor Uses X X X X X X
Atomic Energy Act
Radioactive Wastes X X X
Uranium Mill Tailings X X X X X X
*   Includes non-air-quality health and environmental impacts only.
**  Statute refers only to “cost.”
***  Type of analysis depends on grounds for control.
****  Includes non-water-quality environmental impacts only.3-3
Many of the air pollution regulations for stationary sources are governed by public health
and welfare considerations. EPA must base the primary NAAQS upon air quality criteria and
must allow an “adequate margin of safety ...requisite to protect the public health.”  In setting
2
these regulations, the CAA specifies only that EPA shall consider public health. EPA has not
considered any analyses that evaluate costs or nonhealth benefits. Thus, EPA has considered
part, but not all, of the benefit-cost analyses for these regulations. 
The language for the secondary NAAQS allows the consideration of a broader range of
analyses. EPA must establish the secondary NAAQS “to protect the public welfare from any
known or anticipated adverse effects.”  Effects on welfare are defined in the Act as including,
3
but not being limited to, “effects on soils, water, crops, vegetation, man-made materials,
animals, wildlife, weather, visibility, and climate, damage to and deterioration of property, and
hazards to transportation, as well as effects on economic values and on personal comfort and
well-being.”
4
The National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs) must be set at
the level that “provides an ample margin of safety to protect the public health....”  EPA does
5
consider costs and economic feasibility to a limited extent when setting these standards.
In establishing the performance standards for new stationary sources of pollution, EPA is
required to consider costs. EPA must choose a standard that reflects “the degree of emission
reduction achievable through the application of the best system of continuous emission reduction
which (taking into consideration the cost of achieving such emission reduction, and any non-air
quality health and environmental impact and energy requirements)…has been adequately
demonstrated …”  This language explicitly calls for the consideration of costs, but omits any
6
reference to air quality benefits. Consequently, EPA considers costs, cost-effectiveness and
economic impacts in setting these standards, because cost-effectiveness exclusively considers
costs in relation to emission reduction. It does not consider air-quality-related benefits when
setting these standards.
While establishing emission standards for motor vehicles, EPA generally must consider
costs. For example, certain heavy duty motor vehicle standards are to “reflect the greatest degree
of emission reductions achievable…giving appropriate consideration to the cost of applying such
technology within the period of time available…and to noise, energy, and safety factors
associated with the application of such technology.”  Certain other heavy-duty standards may be
7
revised, if they “cannot be achieved…without increasing cost or decreasing fuel economy to an
excessive and unreasonable degree…”  If these standards are revised, EPA must submit an
8
“analysis of the cost-effectiveness of other strategies for attaining and maintaining national
ambient air quality standards…in relation to the cost-effectiveness for such purposes of
standards which, but for such revision, would apply.”  This language permits the consideration
9
of cost-effectiveness and economic feasibility when setting these standards.
EPA is authorized to develop aircraft emission standards for any pollutant that “may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger the public health or welfare.”  In developing these
10
standards, EPA must give “appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance.”
113-4
For another type of regulation, the CAA specifically calls for benefit-cost analysis. When
controlling or prohibiting motor vehicle fuels or fuel additives for the purpose of preventing
significant impairment of emission controls, EPA must consider “available scientific and
economic data, including a cost-benefit analysis comparing emission control devices or systems




Under the Clean Water Act (CWA), EPA’s principal rulemaking activity is to establish
effluent limitation guidelines for industrial and municipal waste-water treatment facilities.  The
13
CWA specifies that these guidelines are to be technology based. Non-water quality
environmental impacts are to be considered when setting these guidelines, but the benefits of
water-quality improvements are not mentioned as factors to be considered.  The CWA does
14
provide, however, that more stringent water-quality-based effluent limitations are to be imposed
for individual facilities when necessary to meet state water-quality standards.
15
For private treatment plants, the CWA calls for EPA to establish a number of
technology-based effluent-limitation guidelines. Best Practicable Technology (BPT) guidelines,
for example, are to be established considering “the total cost of application of technology in
relation to the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved,” as well as “the age of equipment and
facilities involved, the process employed, the engineering aspects of the application of various
types of control techniques, process changes, non-water quality environmental impact (including
energy requirements), and such other factors as the Administrator deems appropriate.”  For
16
these BPT guidelines, the CWA clearly calls for cost-effectiveness analysis and for the
consideration of economic feasibility, but limits the consideration of benefits to effluent
reduction benefits and non-water quality environmental impacts. The statutory language for the
other technology-based effluent-limitation guidelines is similar, but not identical, to the language
for BPT. When setting these regulations, EPA only considers the benefit-cost analysis called for
in the RIA to the extent authorized for each type of guideline.
The standards for publicly owned treatment works are based upon information relating to
“the degree of effluent reduction available through the application of secondary treatment.”
17
Again, these o re technology-based standards. Because EPA’s standards predate Executive Order
12291, the issue of whether benefit-cost analysis can be considered in the rulemaking process
has not been decided. 
Safe Drinking Water Act
Under the Safe Drinking Water Act,  EPA must establish national primary drinking water
18
regulations for each contaminant which “may have an adverse effect on the health of
persons…”
193-5
The primary drinking water regulations for each contaminant are to be based on a maximum
contaminant level goal (MCLG), set “at a level at which…no known or anticipated adverse
effects on the health of persons occur and which allows an adequate margin of safety.”  The
20
MCLG is based upon these health effects. The primary drinking water regulations are to specify
a maximum contaminant level (MCL), set as close to the MCLG as is feasible. The term
“feasible” is defined in the Act as meaning “feasible with the use of the best technology,
treatment techniques, and other means, which…are available (taking cost into consideration).”
21
When establishing MCLs, EPA considers health benefits, particularly residual risk at alternative
MCL levels as well as costs and technical feasibility. 
Toxic Substances Control Act
The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)  authorizes EPA to prohibit, restrict, or regulate
22
the manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, use or disposal of any substance that
presents “an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.”  EPA’s rules are to be
23
applied “to the extent necessary to protect adequately against such risk using the least
burdensome requirements…”
24
In promulgating any rule under TSCA, EPA is to consider and publish a statement with
respect to 
(A) “the effects…on health and the magnitude of the exposure of human beings…,
(B) “the effects…on the environment and the magnitude of the exposure of the
environment…,
(C) “the benefits of such substance or mixture for various uses and the availability of
substitutes for such uses,
and
(D) “the reasonably ascertainable economic consequences of the rule, after consideration of
the effects on the national economy, small business, technological innovation, the
environment, and public health.”
25
Because this language in TSCA calls for consideration of health and…environmental effects
as well as economic consequences, EPA considers all aspects of benefit-cost analysis in
establishing rules under this authority.
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
The Solid Waste Disposal Act  includes as amendments the Resource Conservation and
26
Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984. In this paper
they are referred to collectively as RCRA, the most commonly used acronym. RCRA directs
EPA to promulgate regulations for generators and transporters of solid waste, as well as owners
and operators of solid waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities. Most of these regulations
are to “establish such standards…as may be necessary to protect human health and the
environment.”
273-6
RCRA clearly places the emphasis in rulemaking upon protecting human health and the
environment. Because the act is generally silent with respect to costs, EPA looked at the
legislative history to determine Congress’ intent. Interpreting this history can be difficult and is
often the subject of debate. When issuing the initial RCRA Subtitle C regulations, for example,
EPA concluded that it could not consider the cost burden on industry as a basis for lessening the
standards, but it could consider cost-effectiveness in choosing among alternatives that would
meet the standards chosen.
28
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA),  as amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
29
(SARA), governs EPA’s responses to releases of hazardous substances into the environment,
along with EPA’s cleanup of inactive hazardous waste disposal sites. EPA must designate which
substances are to be considered hazardous and must set the minimum quantities for reporting
releases. These are to be based upon whether such releases “may present substantial danger to
the public health or welfare or the environment.”  In establishing reportable quantities,
30
therefore, EPA may consider most benefits, but the act is silent with regard to costs or economic
impact analysis.
Under CERCLA. EPA is also responsible for revising the National Oil and Hazardous
Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) for the removal of oil and hazardous substances,
originally published under the Clean Water Act. This plan is to include “means of ensuring that
remedial action measures are cost-effective over the period of potential exposure to the
hazardous substances or contaminated materials.”  EPA has interpreted this language to mean
31
that it should not consider costs when determining the level of control necessary to protect
public health, but can consider cost-effectiveness when choosing among alternatives that would
meet the required level of control. 
 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) is primarily a licensing
statute.  Most of EPA’s actions under FIFRA have to do with registering, and then modifying or
32
canceling the registration of pesticides.
When registering a pesticide, EPA is to determine that the pesticide will not have
“unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.”  These adverse effects are defined to mean
33
“any unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into account the economic, social, and
environmental costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide.”  If EPA finds that a pesticide
34
already registered has unreasonable adverse effects on the environment, it may cancel the
registration or change the classification. In so doing EPA must take into account “the impact of
the action…on production and prices of agricultural commodities, retail food prices, and
otherwise on the agricultural economy.”
353-7
Because the actions taken under this licensing authority are not considered rulemaking under
the terms of Executive Order 12291, RIAs are not prepared for these decisions. Because of
FIFRA’s specific language, a risk-benefit analysis is performed, however, and costs are
considered.
EPA’s formal rulemaking under FIFRA consists almost exclusively in establishing the data
requirements and procedures to be used in the registration process. In establishing these
regulations, EPA is to take into account “the difference in concept and usage between various
classes of pesticides and differences in environmental risk and the appropriate data for valuating
such risk between agricultural and non-agricultural pesticides.”  It must also consider “the effect
36
of the regulation on production and prices of agricultural commodities, retail food prices, and
otherwise on the agricultural economy…”  This language covers most of the costs and benefits
37
associated with pesticide use. Thus, it authorizes EPA to consider most of the benefit-cost and
economic impact analyses in the RIA when establishing regulations under FIFRA.
Atomic Energy Act
Under the Atomic Energy Act and its amendment, the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation
Control Act (UMTRCA), EPA may establish regulations for managing and disposing of
radioactive wastes. A recent amendment to UMTRCA requires EPA to “consider the risk to the
public health, safety, and the environment, the environmental and economic costs of applying
such standards and such other factors as the Administrator determines to be appropriate.”  This
38
broad language allows EPA to consider all aspects of benefit-cost analysis in setting standards
under UMTRCA.Chapter 4
EPA’s Benefit-cost Analyses: 1981-1986
Executive Order 12291 requires EPA to prepare RIAs only for major rules. As the following
table shows, less than 2 percent of the approximately 1,000 regulations issued by EPA from
1981 through 1985 were considered major.
Table 4-1
Number of Major and Non-major Regulations
Issued by EPA: 1981- 85*
Year Non-Major Major
Proposed Final Proposed Final
1981 270 462   1   1
1982 152 182   1   5
1983 154 112   1   1
1984 166 129   7      0
1985 168 122   5     7  
TOTAL 910 1,007   15   14
Source: Office of Management and Budget.
*Most, but not all, regulations are counted twice, as both proposed and final.
From February 1981 through February 1986, the period covered by this report, EPA issued
18 major rules as proposed and/or final rules (see Table 4-2). It prepared RIAs for 15 of these
major rules. OMB exempted the other three major rules from the RIA requirements.
During this same five-year period EPA analyzed many non-major rules. While the executive
order does not require such analysis, OMB’S guidelines require EPA to perform sufficient
analysis to demonstrate that non-major rules meet the order’s objectives. At a minimum, this
analysis must examine costs and economic impacts.4-2
Table 4-2
EPA’s Major Rules
February 1981- February 1986
Act/Rule Proposed Final RIA Exemption
Clean Air Act
National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Nitrogen Dioxide 1984 1985 Yes
National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter 1984 Yes
Requirements for Implementation Plans: Surface Coal Mines 1984 Yes Published
and Fugitive Emissions RIA 2/86
Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles and New 1984 1985 Yes
Motor Vehicle Engines; Gaseous Emission & Particulate
Emission Regs.
Stack Height Regulation 1984 1985 No Court
Deadline
National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Carbon Monoxide 1980 1985 Yes
Fuels and Fuel Additives: Gasoline Lead Content Regulations 1985 1985 Yes
Clean Water Act
Iron and Steel Manufacturing Point Source Category: Effluent 1982 Yes
Limitations Guidelines
Organic Chemicals and Plastics and Synthetic Fibers Industry 1983 Yes
Effluent Guidelines
Toxic Substances Control Act
Asbestos: Proposed Mining and Import Restrictions and 1985 1986 Yes
Proposed Manufacturing, Importation, and Processing
Prohibition
PCB Manufacture Processing, Distribution in Commerce, and 1984 1985 Yes
Use Prohibitions in Electrical Transformers
Premanufacture Notification: Premanufacture Notice 1980 1983 Yes
Requirements and Review Procedures
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
Standards for Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Land 1981 1982 No Court
Disposal Facilities Deadline
Codification Rules 1985 1985 No Legislated
Deadlines
Management of Used Oil 1985 Yes
Restrictions on Land Disposal of Hazardous Wastes 1986 Yes
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation &
Liability Act
National Oil and Hazardous Substances Contingency Plan 1982 Yes
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
Data Requirements for Pesticides Registration 1982/84 1984 Yes4-3
Although this paper focuses on the benefit-cost analyses prepared as part of the RIAs for the
major rules, many of the benefit-cost analyses prepared for the non-major rules represent
significant analytic efforts. For this reason, they are included to some extent in the discussion.
However, only the RIAs for the major rules are included in the tables and charts.
Contents of the RIAs
The appendix summarizes each of the RIAs prepared by EPA for major rules, presents their
conclusions, and comments on how extensively EPA used them in its rulemaking. Table A-1 in
the appendix lists the RIAs prepared for the major rules. 
Table 4-3 summarizes how each of the RIAs prepared by EPA for major rules meets the
requirements of Executive Order 12291 as regards benefit-cost analysis. How each of the RIAs
meets the more detailed specifications of EPA’s and OMB’s guidelines is summarized in Table
A-2 in the appendix.
The benefit-cost analyses prepared for air and water regulations were more complete than
those for the other program areas. This is because the data and analytic techniques necessary for
the analysis of pollutant quantities, exposures, and adverse effects are available more often for,
air and water regulations than for some of the other regulations. The eight analyses for air and
water plus two others were able to estimate the impact of alternatives upon ambient pollution
concentrations. Twelve benefit-cost analyses estimated changes in exposure and/or reductions in
adverse effects projected as a result of the regulatory action. Six of these analyses traced the
benefit estimates completely from improved ambient conditions through reduced exposures and
reduced adverse effects through to estimates of the monetized value of benefits. Because benefits
were monetized in only these analyses, only six of the benefit-cost analyses estimated net
benefits.
These six analyses provided EPA with direct comparisons of the benefits and costs of
regulatory alternatives. Two of these analyses (lead in fuels and NAAQS-PM) showed that more
stringent standards could lead to greater benefits for society. One analysis (surface coal mines)
showed that costs would exceed benefits for two of the three alternatives proposed. Another
(organic chemicals) revealed hitherto unanalyzed inter-media pollution effects that EPA is now
taking into consideration. The remaining two analyses (iron and steel and PCBS) confirmed the
positive net benefits of the preferred regulatory alternatives. 
The RIAs that did not monetize net benefits typically evaluated regulatory alternatives on the
basis of cost per life saved; cost per ton of pollutant removed, or a similar cost-effectiveness
measure. Although these studies might be more appropriately termed cost-effectiveness studies,
they are included in this report under the more general heading of benefit-cost studies because
they compare quantified benefits with monetized costs. 
Although these analyses did not provide EPA with directly comparable estimates of benefits
and costs, they were useful in showing the relationships between benefits, however measured,
and costs. Two of these analyses (used oil and national contingency plan) assisted EPA in 4-4
Table 4-3
EPA’s Benefit-cost Analyses: 1981-86
Act/Rule Benefits Costs Net Benefits
Clean Air Act
NAAQS - N02 X $
NAAQS - PM $ $ $
Surface Coal Mines $ $ $
Heavy Duty Motor Vehicles X $
NAAQS - CO X $
Lead in Fuels $ $ $
Clean Water Act
Iron and Steel $ $ $
Organic Chemicals $ $ $
TSCA
Asbestos X $
PCBs $ $ $
Premanufacture Review X $ X
RCRA
Used Oil X $
Land Disposal X $
CERCLA
Contingency Plan X $
FIFRA
Data Requirements X $ X
X = Item discussed.
$ = Item discussed and monetized.4-5
selecting regulatory alternatives that will result in greater environmental benefits at less cost.
Another (TSCA premanufacture review) showed how the costs of the regulation could be
reduced considerably with no significant reduction in benefits. A fourth analysis (small quantity
generators), on the other hand, showed that greater benefits could be achieved with only a small
increase in costs.
Influence of the Benefit-cost Analyses
Whether benefit-cost analyses have an important influence on a regulation’s development
depends on the degree to which benefit-cost considerations provide clear-cut distinctions
between alternatives, and also on the legislative authority under which EPA issues the
regulation. When trade-offs between benefits and costs have been central issues in choosing
among regulatory alternatives, and when the legislative authority has allowed the full
consideration of benefits and costs, the benefit-cost analyses have played an important role in the
decision-making process.
  The following paragraphs discuss how each of the benefit-cost analyses for major rules and
some of those for non-major rules have influenced the rulemaking process at EPA. This
information has been assembled from the RIAs themselves and from discussions with EPA
officials involved in preparing the RIAs and in making regulatory decisions.
Clean Air Act
NAAQS
Under the Clean Air Act, the primary NAAQS have been based solely on human health
effects, without consideration of welfare benefits, costs, or economic impacts. The cost analyses
in the benefit-cost analyses for the primary NAAQS for nitrogen oxides, particulate matter, and
carbon monoxide were not used in the rulemaking decisions.
Even though the benefit-cost analyses played no role in EPA’s decision making, they were
not without value. For example, the analysis for the PM-NAAQS helped explain to the public
the effects of EPA’s decision, and showed that more stringent standards could lead to greater
benefits to society. 
Surface Coal Mines
In analyzing the listing of surface coal mines for new-source review, EPA considered the
benefits and costs of three alternatives relative to current standards. The analysis showed that the
costs of two of the alternatives exceeded the benefits. The results of the benefit-cost analysis for
the third alternative were inconclusive. EPA is reviewing public comments to the proposal. 
Heavy Duty Motor Vehicles
In setting or revising certain emission standards for heavy duty motor vehicles under the
Clean Air Act, EPA must achieve the greatest degree of emission reduction available, but must
also give appropriate consideration to costs. The RIA for the heavy duty motor vehicle standards
examined the cost-effectiveness of several alternatives. The alternatives chosen were selected on4-6
the basis of the degree of pollution reduction, health and welfare impacts, and technical
feasibility, supported by the cost-effectiveness determinations.
Lead In Fuels
Benefit-cost analysis played an important role in this regulation. In 1982 EPA had tightened
its standard for lead in gasoline, and there was no legislative or other pressure on EPA to further
revise the standard. After reviewing new information, however, EPA officials realized in 1984
that the benefits of a further reduction in lead content might be substantial. Accordingly, EPA
fully analyzed the benefits and costs of the alternatives.
This analysis revealed that reducing the lead content in gasoline from 1.1 to 0.1 grams per
gallon would reduce adverse health effects and medical care and educational costs for children
with high blood lead levels; could reduce deaths, illnesses, and lost wages from cardiovascular
and other diseases; would reduce emissions of other pollutants; and would improve fuel
economy and reduce motor vehicle maintenance costs. The present value of the net benefits to
the nation from 1985 through 1992 of lowering the lead standard to 0.1 grams was calculated to
be $6.7 billion, without considering the benefits of anticipated reductions in adult blood
pressure, the value of which is yet to be determined. In large part because the benefit-cost
l
analysis showed such dramatic net benefits, EPA revised its lead in gasoline standard in 1985 to
0.1 grams per gallon, which became effective on January 1, 1986. Although EPA might have
adopted this revision even without the benefit-cost analysis, that analysis, and the increase in net
benefits it showed, provided a strong justification for the revision. 
Clean Water Act
Under the Clean Water Act, EPA considers the economic feasibility of its effluent
guidelines, but does not consider site-specific benefits of water quality improvements. For the
effluent guidelines for the iron and steel industry, the analysis performed as part of the RIA
confirmed the positive net benefits of the decision that was made using the criteria specified in
the Act.
In preparing the benefit-cost analysis for the proposed organic chemicals guidelines, EPA
found that wastewater treatment processes, which removed pollutants from waste streams before
they reached receiving water bodies, could generate significant emissions of volatile organic
compounds (VOCs) into the air. This analysis showed that the treatment options originally
considered might not be sufficient to control the transfer of pollution from the water to the air.
Consequently, in a July 1985 Federal Register notice, EPA announced its intention to consider
new options to control air emissions of VOCs. Thus, in highlighting the intermedia transfer
issue, this benefit-cost analysis led to the introduction of the new regulatory options that are now
being considered as part of this rulemaking.
Safe Drinking Water Act
Under the Safe Drinking Water Act, EPA considers both health risks and economic
feasibility in deciding and upon drinking-water standards. Although EPA has promulgated no
major rules under the Safe Drinking Water Act since Executive Order 12291 was issued, in the4-7
course of preparing regulatory analyses for its standards pertaining to fluoride and VOCs in
drinking water EPA considered benefits and costs. The analysis for the proposed VOC MCLs
showed substantial differences in the cost-effectiveness of alternative standards. This
information is being considered as part of the regulatory decision making. 
Toxic Substances Control Act
Asbestos
EPA announced regulations for asbestos before the issuance of Executive Order 12291. After
this order, the benefit-cost analysis already under way became part of an extensive RIA. The
analysis included ten options in addition to the proposed option. The results of this analysis
supported the proposal to ban some uses of asbestos and to phase out others.
PCBs
EPA prepared three different benefit-cost analyses in conjunction with the regulation of
PCBs, although only one of these was associated with a major rule. For uncontrolled sources,
industry and environmental groups negotiated a proposed rule. The benefit-cost analysis was
used mainly to verify the economic feasibility of that proposal. For the regulation of PCBs in
transformers, the benefit-cost analysis was used to determine the economic feasibility of the
various options. This proved useful in selecting the alternatives preferred for the different
segments of the regulated community. For the regulation of PCBs in electrical equipment, the
RIA played a similarly useful role in determining which options would be feasible for different
segments of the industry. 
TSCA Premanufacture Review
In establishing the requirements for premanufacture review under TSCA, EPA identified the
major issue as being how much information to require on the application form. One major
consideration was the limit of EPA’s authority – i.e., how much information EPA could legally
require. Costs and economic impacts were another major consideration in this rulemaking,
because there was concern that high costs might discourage innovation in the chemical industry.
In analyzing the benefits and costs of alternative forms for use in EPA’s premanufacture
review of new chemicals, EPA’s Office of Toxic Substances (OTS) developed a new alternative
that would substantially reduce costs without significantly lowering the probability of
identifying a problem chemical. The alternative eventually chosen as a result of both the cost and
legal considerations provided sufficient information to protect public health, yet cost less than
half as much as the alternative originally considered. The total annual savings were estimated to
be approximately $4 million.
2
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
Used Oil
RCRA directed EPA to consider the impact upon recycling used oil, when setting standards
for managing used oil. The benefit-cost analysis showed that modifying the regulations not only4-8
 In November 1986, subsequent to the time period covered by this report, EPA
*
announced that it would not list any used oil bound for recycling as hazardous waste and would
reconsider its proposed regulation for used oil bound for disposal. 
would reduce costs, but would lead to an increase in recycling and a concomitant decrease in
risk.
Before the benefit-cost analysis, EPA had considered applying the full RCRA hazardous
waste regulations uniformly to all categories of generators of used oil. The benefit-cost analysis
showed that the cost of the full regulations would be large for small generators, and that this
could lead to the increased dumping of used oil. By proposing different standards for small,
medium, and large generators, and by reducing standards for some used oil transporters, EPA
reduced the estimated cost of the proposed regulation  by approximately $358 million a year.  In
* 3
addition, reducing the costs to small generators would lead to fewer incidents of dumping, which
would in turn result in fewer cases of cancer.  
4
Land Disposal
RCRA calls for the prohibition of the land disposal of hazardous wastes, unless the waste is
pretreated in accordance with standards set by EPA, or unless the Administrator determines that
a method of land disposal would prevent migration of hazardous constituents from disposal sites
for as long as the waste remained hazardous. Benefit-cost analysis did not play a role in this
decision.
Small Quantity Generators
In regulating generators of small quantities of waste, EPA was restricted by RCRA to
considering the health effects and the regulatory burden of the regulations. The proposed rule
required minimal paperwork from small-quantity generators. Many of the comments received
made EPA aware that this aspect of the rule might not provide sufficient information to
enforcement personnel. Thus, EPA expanded the benefit-cost analysis to address this issue.
The revised analysis showed that the cost of additional record-keeping requirements for each
facility would be only $34 per year, which would not increase the burden to the regulated
community significantly.  Thus, the benefit-cost analysis helped resolve the issue and led to
5
setting a stricter standard than was originally proposed.
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
In developing the 1982 revisions to the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution
Contingency Plan (NCP), EPA considered costs as well as engineering feasibility,
environmental, welfare and public health effectiveness in choosing among alternative regulatory
options, but did not consider monetized benefits. The RIA showed the proposed alternative,
which emphasized public health concerns in characterizing the objectives of the NCP revisions,
to be less costly and to result in a greater reduction in the population exposed to contaminated
groundwater than the other alternative considered, which emphasized public welfare and the4-9
environment. EPA’s subsequent revision to the NCP in 1985 was not considered a major rule
and consequently was not accompanied by an RIA. 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
Of the regulations promulgated by EPA under FIFRA, the one for which benefit-cost
analysis had the most impact was the establishment of data requirements for registering
pesticides. Early in the regulatory process, the analysis of benefits and costs showed that testing
all new pesticide formulations would be extremely expensive, compared with testing only active
ingredients, and would not have any substantial benefits. Consequently, this alternative, which
was not cost-effective, was eliminated very early in the decision-making process.
The benefit-cost analysis for the emergency exemption regulations, a non-major rule under
FIFRA, played a similar role to that for data requirements. Throughout the rulemaking process,
the costs and benefits of suggested alternatives were analyzed. These analyses eliminated most
suggestions and eventually pointed to the cost-effective alternatives that were finally considered
in the rulemaking.Chapter 5
Contributions of Benefit-cost Analysis
As we have seen, the benefit-cost analyses prepared by EPA have clearly influenced the
regulations for which they were written. But the contributions of these analyses go beyond
individual regulations. They have increased awareness of the environmental results of EPA’s
regulations, provided a framework for comparing regulations both within a single medium and
across media, identified cross-media effects, and improved analytic techniques. 
Improving Regulations
Chapter 4 provides examples of the different ways that benefit-cost analysis has improved
individual environmental regulations. These include:
1. guiding the regulation’s development (lead in fuels);
2. adding new alternatives (TSCA premanufacture review, organic chemicals,
small-quantity generators);
3. eliminating alternatives that are not cost-effective (FIFRA data requirements);
4. adjusting alternatives to account for differences between industries or industry
segments (asbestos, PCBS, used oil); and
5. supporting decisions (heavy duty motor vehicles, iron and steel).
In some cases benefit-cost analyses have improved regulations by showing how more
stringent alternatives would bring about a greater reduction in pollution without an undue
increase in costs. In two instances this led to the adoption of regulations that were more stringent
than previously contemplated (lead in fuels and small-quantity generators). In other cases the
analyses showed that the costs of more stringent regulations would be disproportional to the
expected benefits. In three instances this led EPA to select less stringent regulatory alternatives
(FIFRA data requirements, TSCA premanufacture review, and used oil). In each of these cases,
the result has been reduced regulatory burdens without significant reductions in environmental
improvement.
The monetary value of three of these regulatory improvements, as measured by the potential
increase in net benefits attributable to the regulations, is summarized below.5-2
Potential Increase in Net Benefits of Regulations
RIA  Change in Regulation Potential Increase in
Total Net Benefits
Lead in Fuels more stringent standard, $6.7 billion
 1
greater health and welfare benefits
Used Oil reduced regulatory costs, $3.6 billion 
2
greater reduction in risk
Premanufacture reduced regulatory costs, $40 million 
3
Review no significant reduction
in effectiveness
While these potential improvements cannot be attributed solely to benefit-cost analyses, it is
fair to say that these analyses played a major role in bringing about regulatory improvement.
Compared to these regulatory improvements of over $10 billion, the cost of performing the
analyses has been modest. Twelve of the fifteen RIAs prepared by EPA for major rules cost less
than $10 million (see Chapter 6). Thus, the return to society from improved environmental
regulations is more than one thousand times EPA’s investment in the benefit-cost analyses. 
Increasing Awareness of Environmental Results
EPA’s first regulatory analyses focused upon costs and economic impacts. As the marginal
benefit of increased regulation became more of an issue, and as analytic techniques improved,
EPA undertook more benefit-cost analyses. Executive Order 12291 brought this trend to its
logical conclusion by requiring benefit-cost analysis of most major rules and by designating net
benefits as the measure of a regulation’s merit.
The formal consideration of benefits for each proposal has brought to light considerably
more information about the environmental results of EPA’s regulations than has been available
before. This has led to an increased awareness of the improvements in human health and welfare
and the environment that result from environmental regulation.
The benefit-cost analysis for lead in fuels discussed in Chapter 4 provides a good example of
this effect. In analyzing the benefits of reducing the lead content of gasoline, EPA learned a
great deal about the health benefits that would result if lead emissions were reduced. This
resulted in a substantial reduction in the lead content permitted in gasoline. EPA is also using
some of the information from this benefit-cost analysis to evaluate the benefits of reducing lead
in drinking water. This is a good example of how benefit-cost analysis can contribute to an
increased environmental awareness that goes beyond a specific regulation.5-3
Creating a Consistent Framework for Evaluating Environmental Initiatives
The benefit-cost approach means that regulatory proposals now integrate scientific and
economic information into a more consistent, comprehensive framework that informs decision
makers about the expected outcomes of alternative regulatory proposals. Estimating and
monetizing both the benefits and costs of regulations result in a set of measures that can be used
not only to evaluate the alternatives for each regulation, but also to compare different regulations
and environmental programs across media. This makes it possible to begin to examine the
relative effectiveness of different regulations and different programs. 
Highlighting Cross-media Effects
Because environmental regulations typically deal with only one medium (e.g., water), their
analysis formerly was restricted to one medium. Benefit-cost analyses cover all media. In some
cases, this has led to an awareness of cross-media effects that had not been noted previously.
For example, in analyzing the benefits of treating wastewaters in the plastics and organic
chemicals industries, EPA learned that the systems being considered to treat water pollution
would volatilize many organic compounds, thereby creating a potential air pollution problem
near the treatment sites. As a result, EPA is considering additional regulatory approaches. 
The increased awareness of cross-media effects has led to similar studies in many program
areas. EPA’s budget priorities for FY 1987 include cross-media reviews for municipal
combusters and wastewater sludge management. In addition, EPA’s Office of Policy, Planning
and Evaluation has initiated a series of integrated environmental management studies that are
examining intermedia risk transfers associated with all types of pollution control activities in
different geographic areas. 
Improving Analytic Techniques
The increased emphasis on benefits has stimulated the introduction of new measures of
environmental results and has led to improvements in existing techniques for estimating benefits.
Similarly, the formal requirements for full cost and economic impact analyses have stimulated
improvements in the techniques used to estimate costs and economic impacts.
The analysis prepared for the National Ambient Air Quality Standard for Particulate Matter
illustrates the progress that has been made in quantifying benefits. Because of recent scientific
and economic developments and the availability of new data, EPA was able to break new ground
for this analysis. The analysis used several techniques for estimating indicators of environmental
benefits, including exposure-response estimates, hedonic models of changes in property values
or wages, and direct economic models of behavioral responses of individuals and firms. Using
these different measures, EPA estimated the net benefits of each regulatory alternative. The
resulting range of net benefits for each alternative could then be compared and evaluated, taking
the pros and cons of each technique into account.Chapter 6
Limitations of Benefit-cost Analysis
Benefit-cost analysis and the RIA process have been subject to considerable scrutiny since
Executive Order 12291 was issued. The GAO report pointed to a number of limitations in the
l
three analyses it reviewed, and a number of subsequent studies  have addressed the subject. In
2
addition, EPA’s Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation recently published a report on how to
improve RIAs for hazardous waste regulations (“EPA’s study”).
3
In general, three major types of limitations are discussed in these reviews: (1) those inherent
in the nature of economic analyses in general, (2) those caused by gaps in available information
and deficiencies in analytic techniques, and (3) those that are the result of errors and omissions
in the execution of the analysis. Another issue that has been raised is the cost and time required
to perform benefit-cost analyses.
Limitations of Economic Analysis
Benefit-cost analysis, in particular the estimate of net benefits, provides only one perspective
on regulatory alternatives. A single measure of efficiency, such as net benefits, can never present
a complete picture of issues that deal with such complex matters as risks to human health and
environmental degradation. An estimate of net benefits cannot account for differences in
technical feasibility among alternatives, for example, even though feasibility questions may be
of paramount importance. 
The results of benefit-cost analyses must always be regarded in light of the results of other
types of analyses, the uncertainties inherent in complex environmental situations, and the many
subjective evaluations that must accompany environmental decisions. Some of the limitations of
the economic measures used in benefit-cost analyses are discussed below.
Efficiency Measures
Every economic measure of efficiency is based upon a number of implicit assumptions. A
simple estimate of net benefits, for example, assumes that distributional effects are not
important. Yet distributional effects are almost always significant in environmental decisions.
Usually, environmental regulations increase costs for one group of people – the polluters – and
produce benefits for another group – the public in general, and especially the people who live
near the polluters. On the one hand, these results may be viewed as transfers of wealth from the
polluters to the public. On the other hand, they may be viewed as restoring to the public the
benefits of a clean environment that had been taken from them.
Another assumption implied in using maximum net benefits as a decision rule is that this is
the sole objective of environmental decision making. Again, this is oversimplification, for6-2
environmental decisions often are based on many objectives. Decision makers may want to
provide incentives for further research and development, for example, or may want to minimize
unemployment and economic dislocations. 
EPA’s RIA guidelines call for a full discussion of all distributional effects, feasibility
considerations, and other issues that may be important to the environmental decision.
Nevertheless, because benefit-cost analysis tends to focus on numerical estimates of net benefits,
there is always the danger that these other issues will be given insufficient attention. 
Single Estimates
Many benefit-cost analyses express net benefits in terms of a single dollar value, rather than
as a range of dollar values. These point estimates may hide many uncertainties in the underlying
analyses. As explained in more detail below, there are often many gaps in the data that must be
used in benefit-cost analyses, and there may be deficiencies in the analytic techniques as well.
EPA’s RIA guidelines specify that estimates of net benefits should be presented as a range of
estimates and should be accompanied by a full discussion of the uncertainties involved.
Nevertheless, the GAO study found that this directive was often ignored. One of GAO’s
strongest recommendations was that EPA place more emphasis on the uncertainties inherent in
the benefit-cost analyses and that estimates be presented as ranges, rather than point estimates. 
Valuation of Human Health
Perhaps the most controversial issue in relation to the economic analysis of environmental
regulations is the valuation placed upon reducing health risks. EPA’s guidelines offer extensive
information on current techniques that are available for making such estimates, but the state of
the art in this area remains controversial. There is no consensus on the value of reducing
morbidity and mortality risks. Nevertheless, it is necessary to develop a general understanding of
these issues, so that comparisons can be made among the multitude of human health and welfare
benefits that result from environmental regulations. 
The most common approaches used by economists to derive a value for reducing risks to
human life are based upon laborers’ willingness to accept increased risk in exchange for
additional wages. While these studies provide some insight into how people view increased risks
to life and limb, not everyone will agree that the methodology is sound. Some commenters argue
that workers are not well informed and may not make employment decisions freely, without
economic pressure. Others point out that workers may not perceive their increased risks as
significant and would act much differently, if they thought that they actually would lose their
lives. 
There is no unequivocally valid method for converting human health risks into monetary
terms. As the National Academy of Sciences’ Committee on Principles of Decision Making for
Regulating Chemicals in the Environment concluded: 
Different individuals place different values on things such as human life, aesthetics, or
national security. Thus an analysis that assigns a quantitative value to…these factors is
necessarily subjective, and to some degree, arbitrary.
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Discounting Future Benefits
Another controversial issue in relation to the economic measures used in RIAs is the question
of evaluating future benefits. Not only is there the problem of estimating the value of benefits
that may only potentially be realized, i.e., groundwater that is not now but may become a source
of drinking water, but there is also the problem of placing a dollar value on benefits realized in
the future when compared with benefits realized today.
OMB’s guidelines Call for all benefits and costs to be discounted back to the present, using a
discount rate of 10 percent, although the effect of using other discount rates may also be
analyzed. Some commenters argue that a real rate of 10 percent is too high, and a more
appropriate rate would be in the range of 5 to 7 percent. Others argue that it is inappropriate to
use the discount rate for money when discounting human health risks. Yet others argue that there
is no legitimate discount rate that can be applied to future “lives saved,” because there are no
real-world market transactions in “life saving” that can be used to assess the value that society
places on future lives saved versus current lives saved.
While some economists are proponents of discounting, others argue that reductions in future
health risks should never be discounted, because discounting may significantly reduce the
apparent severity of future health effects, and lead to the choice of an inequitable option. When
using a 10 percent discount rate, for example, we value 100 lives saved 30 years in the future the
same as 6 lives saved in the present. Thus, when a high discount rate is used, expenditures made
to save lives in the future appear to be much less effective than expenditures that will save lives
today.
Discounting is designed to help assess only whether an action is efficient, not whether it is
equitable. As shown above, discounting for environmental regulations that span several
generations may obscure intergenerational inequities. Thus, discounting again raises the question
of how efficiency measures, such as net benefits, can account for distributional inequities, such
as the distribution of health risks among generations.
Information Gaps and Analytic Deficiencies
Benefit-cost analyses can involve the collection of vast amounts of scientific data, the
modeling of complex environmental phenomena, and the tracing of these environmental
phenomena through to the calculation of human exposures and the estimation of resultant
diseases and deaths. Estimating costs and economic impacts can involve similar degrees of
difficulty. Not surprisingly, there are many gaps in the scientific knowledge and many
deficiencies in the analytic techniques necessary to complete these analyses.
The GAO report identified several such gaps in the three analyses studied.  These included
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difficulties in determining the changes in air and water quality that result from reductions in
discharges, problems in relating changes in air and water quality to diseases, the necessity of
having to estimate health risks to humans from low-level doses of pollution using data from
experiments that were based on high-level doses to animals, and problems associated with
having to use health studies from the United Kingdom, where the chemical makeup of the air6-4
might differ significantly from that in the United States. These last two deficiencies highlight a
related problem: even though scientific data may be available, they may not be available in a
form that is directly applicable to the proposed regulations.
A good example of this is provided by the recent proposed National Ambient Air Quality
Standard for particulate matter. EPA proposed to express the standard in units of particulate that
are 10 microns or less in diameter (PM10), because it believed that these smaller particulates are
better indicators of the particles that are or concern for human health. Unfortunately, much of
the research on particulate matter is expressed in units other than PM10, units that may be less
useful for estimating health effects.
EPA’s study found several limitations in many of the analytic methods used in the
benefit-cost analyses. Among other things, the study recommended that EPA (1) develop more
realistic models to estimate releases to groundwater, (2) generate more explicit estimates of the
fate of toxic chemicals in air, surface water, landfills, and groundwater, (3) develop more
realistic exposure models including the actual timing, persons affected, and levels of expected
exposure, and (4) develop dynamic models fur estimating the impacts of increased costs upon
market behavior.
When data are poor or analytic techniques deficient, the reliability of the benefit-cost
analyses deteriorates. To protect the soundness of the environmental decisions based on such
analyses, decision makers must be informed of the effect that uncertainties have upon the
assessment of the regulatory alternatives. Although EPA’s RIA guidelines call for a full
discussion of all analytic uncertainties in benefit-cost analyses, the GAO report and EPA’s study
both found that these guidelines were not always followed adequately. The GAO report
recommended more discussion of uncertainties and EPA’s study recommended that more
sensitivity analyses be performed whenever considerable uncertainties in the data or analyses
exist. 
Deficiencies in Execution
Besides the questions of fundamentals and state of the art is the question of whether
benefit-cost analyses are prepared correctly. In light of the many complex analyses required for
each regulation, it is not surprising that several of the EPA’s benefit-cost analyses have been
found to be deficient. 
The GAO report found several deficiencies in three benefit-cost analyses. In one case EPA
failed to consider costs for new sources in determining whether a rule was to be classified as
major. In the same case, EPA did not consider any regulatory alternatives. In other cases, EPA
did not evaluate the benefits and costs of some of the most promising alternatives. EPA was also
criticized for not considering all categories of benefits and costs in its analyses. Perhaps the most
emphasized of the deficiencies identified in the GAO report is that EPA did not prominently
discuss the uncertainties of its analyses and did not present decision makers with ranges of
values that would reflect those uncertainties.6-5
Several other studies have found deficiencies in the technical aspects of some of EPA’s
benefit-cost analyses.  These include (1) using unrealistic assumptions when preparing exposure
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estimates, (2) not assigning dollar values to health benefits (3) not using common time periods
when estimating benefits and costs, (4) failing to consider distributional effects, (5) improperly
considering employment consequences and (6) not incorporating overall market trends into the
economic analyses.
EPA’s RIA guidelines provide technical guidance on how to properly prepare benefit-cost
analyses. These guidelines deal with all of the deficiencies mentioned above. If these guidelines
are followed, EPA’s analyses will be as good as the underlying data and analytic techniques
permit. But because time, budget, and other considerations do not always support complete
analyses, it is important that, at the very least, decision makers be made aware of the deficiencies
in each analysis and the implications thereof.
Cost of the Analyses
Benefit-cost analyses require significant time and resources to complete. Some commenters
have questioned whether the analyses are worth their cost.
Table 6-1 presents estimates of the costs of the RIAs prepared by EPA. The total cost of the
twelve RIAs for which cost information is available was approximately $8.1 million. The cost of
each RIA ranged from $210,000 to $2,380,000, with an average cost of approximately
$675,000.  
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When compared with the costs of at least $100 million per year that are associated with each
major regulation, a one-time cost of less than $1 million for each benefit-cost analysis seems
modest. As explained in Chapter 5, benefit-cost analyses often result in significant regulatory
improvements worth many times the costs of the analyses. Three of the benefit-cost analyses
covered by this report helped to increase the net benefits associated with their respective
regulations by over $10 billion.6-6
Table 6-1
Estimated Costs of RIAs
Act/Rule Contractor Costs EPA Personnel Total Costs
FTE (yrs) $
Clean Air Act
NAAQS - N02 $744,000 3.5 $210,000 $954,000
NAAQS - PM $1,541,000 14.0 $840,000 $2,381,000*
Surface Coal Mines $150,000 1.0  $60,000 $210,000*
Heavy Duty Motor Vehicles n.a.    n.a. n.a. n.a.
NAAQS - CO $405,000 2.0 $120,000 $525,000
Lead in Fuels $522,000 8.0 $480,000 $1,002,000
Clean Water Act
Iron and Steel $150,000 2.5 $150,000 $300,000
Organic Chemicals $225,000 2.0 $120,000 $345,000*
TSCA
Asbestos $915,000 2.5 $150,000 $1,065,000*
PCBs $156,000 1.0  $60,000 $216,000*
Premanufacture Review n.a.    n.a. n.a. n.a.
RCRA
Used Oil $450,000 1.5 $90,000 $540,000*
Land Disposal $200,000 3.0 $180,000 $380,000
CERCLA
Contingency Plan n.a.    n.a. n.a. n.a.
FIFRA
Data Requirements $40,000 3.5 $210,000 $250,000
* Rule has been proposed, but is not yet final. Further analysis may be required.
n.a. = not available
Source: See note #7, Chapter 6.Chapter 7
Directions for the Future
Benefit-cost analysis has proven to be a useful tool not only for comparing alternatives for a
specific regulation, but also for comparing the relative value of the many different regulations
that are written in response to EPA’s various statutory authorities. Through such analyses EPA is
increasing its ability to decide how to apply the nation’s limited resources to achieve greater
levels of environmental protection, not only within but across environmental media.
As EPA has advanced its analytic capability, it has begun to discover limitations in some of
the traditional decision criteria for setting standards. EPA’s experience shows that these decision
criteria, such as “health effects thresholds,” margins of safety, and technical feasibility,”
frequently do not provide clear distinctions for decision making. As is often the case, EPA must
then rely upon its analytic capabilities in other areas to provide the information on which to
formulate its decisions.
Nowhere is this difficulty more apparent than in setting standards that are to be based on
health effects or technology thresholds. For many pollutants it is becoming increasingly difficult
to find an established threshold below which there are no adverse health effects. At the same
time, engineering advances are producing more pollution control technology that can achieve
zero discharge of pollutants, albeit usually at a high cost. Where there are no health effects
thresholds and no limits to control technology, then choosing an appropriate level of control may
best be done by balancing the relative benefits and costs of additional levels of control. In
adopting National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs) for
carcinogens, for example, EPA considers both economic and technological feasibility when
establishing an ample margin of safety to protect public health. 
While recognizing their limitations, EPA finds benefit-cost and similar analyses to be
increasingly useful tools in helping provide the balance required when choosing appropriate
levels of environmental control. Consequently, EPA is committed to strengthening its
capabilities for performing benefit-cost analyses and to improving the research programs that
provide the underlying economic, scientific, and technical information for these complex
regulatory decisions. 7-2
Strengthening Analytic Capabilities
EPA has prepared RIA guidelines to ensure that benefit-cost analyses are based upon the best
information available and the best analytic techniques that the state of the art permits. The
guidelines provide extensive information on how to perform each portion of the analyses. When
written according to these guidelines, the RIAs will not only present thorough benefit-cost
analyses, but will also discuss the uncertainties and multidimensional consequences of regulatory
alternatives.
EPA is continually refining its RIA guidelines to upgrade the information that is available to
assist program offices in preparing benefit-cost analyses. For example, EPA is currently
updating its guidance on valuing reductions in mortality and morbidity risks and on alternative
procedures for considering future benefits and costs.
EPA’s management has implemented an options selection procedure that requires program
offices to describe more than one regulatory option and then to document the most likely
connection between regulatory expenditures and environmental results. Management is also
supporting the establishment of analytical divisions in program offices now lacking analytic
personnel and resources. The continued commitment of EPA’s management to requiring
rigorous analysis from all program offices will ensure that major environmental regulations are
properly supported with benefit-cost analyses.
 To facilitate better cross-program and cross-media comparisons of risk assessments, EPA is
working to ensure that all the data and methodologies used in these assessments are consistent.
An example of this effort is the work now under way to develop consistency among the many
standards for toxic chemicals. A report by EPA’s Chemical Coordination Staff demonstrated that
maximum exposure limits (MELs) for many chemicals often were not consistent across
programs. This report identified the need to base MELs upon consistent health data and upon
consistent analytic methodology. EPA is now developing the information and the methodology
that will be used to bring more consistency to regulations involving these chemicals. EPA
recently released guidelines for assessing the risks associated with cancer, mutagenicity,
chemical mixtures, and developmental toxicity, and for estimating exposures. Additional risk
assessment guidelines arc being prepared. 
Focusing Environmental and Economic Research
Since the late seventies, EPA’s research, and development program has become increasingly
more focused on providing the data and methods required for sound regulatory development.
The 1978 annual authorization for environmental research carried a very strong message
from Congress that the relationship between environmental research and regulation must be
strengthened. To that end, EPA established several pilot research planning committees
comprised of senior research scientists and EPA regulatory office representatives to jointly set
the research agenda for the coming years. Based on the success of these efforts, the research
committee planning approach was expanded over the next several years to encompass EPA’s
entire research and development program. These committees now meet periodically to review7-3
current-year research projects for relevance to regulatory office priorities, and to plan future
research to address critical gaps in data needed for regulatory decision making. Benefit-cost
analyses provide a framework for identifying those areas in which better information is required
and consequently influence the deliberations of each of the research committees.
Two recent developments have served to sharpen the focus of EPA’s scientific research on
regulatory needs. First, the Assistant Administrator for EPA’s Office of Research and
Development (ORD) has conducted meetings with each of EPA’s program offices to set out their
mutual understanding of the highest priority regulatory activities in the upcoming budget that
require ORD’s support. And second, EPA’s Deputy Administrator has established a process by
which program offices, on completing a rulemaking that is subject to periodic review, identify in
writing to ORD those data gaps that should be filled before the next review cycle. Both of these
efforts reflect EPA’s greater reliance on high-quality research outputs for informed decision
making. Two areas receiving ORD’s increased attention are improving estimates of total human
exposure to pollutants and relating pollutant exposure more precisely to health and ecological
outcomes. These areas are crucial to assessing the risks from environmental pollution and
evaluating the benefits of pollution control. Knowledge gained in these areas will improve
EPA’s ability to analyze these important factors in future RIAs.
EPA’s Office of Research and Development has also continued to strengthen the
mechanisms it uses to ensure the scientific quality of its research products. Recently, it has
augmented its longstanding reliance on peer reviews of all published reports to include the
establishment of several standing peer review panels composed of experts from outside EPA.
Panel members are selected by EPA’s Science Advisory Board (SAB) to review research in
progress that is of particular importance to the regulatory offices. These panels transmit their
views to the SAB and to EPA’s Deputy Administrator.
Since FY 1972, EPA has had an extensive research program to improve the economic data
and methodologies available for doing cost-benefit analysis. In 1983 EPA’s research efforts in
that area were consolidated into the Economic Research Program of EPA’s Office of Policy
Analysis. Although both the economic methodologies and the data used in preparing cost-benefit
analyses are much improved over the early 1970s, much still remains to be done if EPA is to be
able to accurately value the economic benefits of its proposed regulations. Improved methods are
particularly needed for valuing benefits for which no private markets exist. The Economic
Research Program has funded much of the research that resulted in the contingent valuation
method for valuing such nonmarket goods, and is working to solve the problems that remain
before this valuation method can be routinely applied. One problem of particular importance is
the lack of adequate methodology and data for valuing most ecological benefits. These and other
methodological and data problems are the subject of continuing research, usually in the form of
demonstration projects involving applications to proposed EPA regulations.Notes
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Exhibit VIII-6. Comparison is between the annual cost of the FINAL Form ($5.2 – $13
million) and the annual cost of the EPA79 Form ($6.9 – $20.6 million).
3. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste, Economic Analysis Branch,
“Regulatory Impact Analysis Proposed Standards for the Management of Used Oil,”
Washington, D.C., November 1985; p. I-5. Figure represents the difference between the
Grand Total costs for Full subtitle C regulations ($525.3 million) and the Proposal ($167.1
million) in Table I-2.N-4
4. Ibid., p. I-8. The statement is based on the difference between the total cancer risk over 70
years for the Full Subtitle C regulations (6,064 cases of cancer) and the Proposal (6,016
cases) in Table I-5.
5. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste, “Regulatory Analysis for
Final RCRA Rule for Certain Small Quantity Generators of Hazardous Waste,” prepared by
Industrial Economics, Inc., Cambridge, Massachusetts, December 1985, p. 6.17. Figure is
from Exhibit 6-1 and is the difference between total annual costs for Option C-3 ($222) and
Option C-2 ($188).
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1. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Policy Analysis, “Costs and Benefits of
Reducing Lead in Gasoline Final Regulatory Impact Analysis,” EPA-230-05-85-006,
Washington, D.C., February 1985, p. VIII-26. Figure is for “Net Benefits Excluding Blood
Pressure” from the “No Misfueling” column of Table VIII-8.
2. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste, Economic Analysis Branch,
“Regulatory Impact Analysis – Proposed Standards for the Management of Used Oil,”
Washington, D.C., November, 1985; p. I-5. The figure is the present value of the $357
million cost savings realized each year for 70 years discounted at 10% interest. The $357
million annual savings is the difference between the Grand Total Costs for Full Subtitle C
regulations ($559.1 million) and the proposal ($201.9 million) in Table I-2.
3. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Economics and Technology Division, “Regulatory
Impact Analysis for New Chemical Reporting Alternatives under Section 5 of TSCA,”
prepared by ICF Incorporated, Washington, D.C., May 10, 1983; p. 206. The figure is the
present value of $4 million cost savings realized each year for an indefinite period
discounted at 10% interest. The $4 million annual savings is the average difference between
the annual cost of the EPA 79 Form ($6.9 $20.6 million) and the FINAL Form ($5.2 $13
million) as reported in Exhibit VIII-6.
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Environmental Regulations, Despite Limitations, Report to the Congress of the United States by
the Comptroller General (GAO/RCED-84-62), Washington, D.C., April 6, 1984.
2. See for example:
McGarity, Thomas D., The Role of Regulatory Analysis In Regulatory Decision Making, a
Report Prepared for the Administrative Conference of the United States; Austin, Texas,
1985; and, V. K. Smith, ed., Environmental Policy Under Reagan’s Executive Order: The
Role of Benefit-Cost Analysis; University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, N.C., 1984.
See especially the article by W. Norton Grubb, Dale Whittington, and Michael Humphries,N-5
“The Ambiguities of Benefit-Cost Analysis: An Evaluation of Regulatory Impact Analyses
Under Executive Order 12291.”
3. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation,
Economic Analysis Division, Improving RIAs: Suggestions for the Analysis of Hazardous
Waste Regulations, EPA-230-02-87-023, Washington, D.C., January 1987.
4. National Academy of Sciences, Decision-Making for Regulating Chemicals in Our
Environment, 17-22 (1975); p. 484.
5. GAO; op. cit.
6. See Note #2.
7. Contract costs and FTE estimates have been obtained from EPA personnel familiar with the
RIAs. In most cases, these were the RIA project officers, and their estimates were based on
memory and on a brief examination of contract files.
The estimated cost of $60,000 per FTE was obtained from EPA’s Office of Policy Analysis
(OPA) and includes OPA’s estimate of approximately $45,000 per FTE to cover salary,
travel, benefits, etc., plus approximately $15,000 per FTE to cover rent, electricity,
telephones, and other agencywide overhead. Although these costs may vary from program to
program, this estimate has been used to approximate EPA’s costs.Appendix
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U. S. Environmental Protection Agency
RIAs Prepared For Major Rules
February 1981- February 1986
Act/Ria Short Title Date EPA Office
Clean Air Act
Regulatory Impact Analysis of the National Ambient
Air Quality Standards for Nitrogen Dioxide NAAQS - N02 2/85 Air
Benefits and Net Benefit Analysis of Alternative
National Ambient Air Quality Standards for
Particulate Matter NAAQS -PM 3/83 Air
Regulatory Impact Analysis: Listing of Surface Surface Coal
Coal Mines for New Source Review Mines 2/86 Air
Regulatory Impact Analysis, Oxides of Nitrogen Pollutant Heavy Duty Mobile 
Specified Study and Summary and analysis of Comments Motor Vehicles 3/85 Sources
Regulatory Impact Analysis of the National Ambient
Air Quality Standards for Carbon Monoxide NAAQS - CO 7/85 Air
Costs and Benefits of Reducing Lead in Gasoline: Policy 
Final Regulatory Impact Analysis Lead in Fuels 2/85 Analysis
Clean Water Act
Regulatory Impact Analysis of the Effluent Limitation Guidelines
Regulation for the Iron & Steel Industry Iron and Steel 3/82 Water
The Economic Benefits of the Proposed Effluent
Limitations Guidelines for the Organic Chemicals Organic Chemicals Policy
and Plastics and Synthetic Fibers Industry 1/83 Analysis
Toxic Substances Control Act
Regulatory Impact Analysis of Controls on Asbestos Toxic
and Asbestos Products Asbestos 8/85 Substances
Regulatory Impact Analysis of the Final Rule for 6/85 Toxic
Non-Substation PCB Transformers PCBs Substances
Regulatory Impact Analysis for New Chemical Premanufacture Toxic
Reporting Alternatives under Section 5 of TSCA Review 5/83 SubstancesTable A-1 (cont’d)
U. S. Environmental Protection Agency
RIAs Prepared For Major Rules
February 1981- February 1986
Act/Ria Short Title Date EPA Office
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
Regulatory Impact Analysis of Proposed Standards
for the Management of Used Oil Used Oil 11/85 Solid Waste
Regulatory Analysis of Proposed Restrictions on
Land Disposal of Hazardous Wastes Land Disposal 12/85 Solid Waste
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act
Regulatory Impact Analysis of the Revisions to the National Oil Emergency &
and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Remedial
Contingency Plan Plan 2/82 Response
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
Regulatory Impact Analysis: Data Requirements for Registering
Pesticides under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Data
Rodenticide Act Requirements 8/82 PesticidesTable A-2
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EPA’s Compliance With EPA And OMB Guidelines For RIAs
Section 1
Statement of the Need and Consequences of the Proposal
Act/Rule Identify Estimate Describe Estimate Describe
Pollutants Quantities Environmental Pollutant Environmental
Impact Reduction Benefits
Clean Air Act
NAAQS - N02 X X X X X
NAAQS - PM X X X X X
Surface Coal Mines X X X X X
Heavy Duty Motor Vehicles X X X X X
NAAQS - CO X X X X X
Lead in Fuels X X X X X
Clean Water Act
Iron and Steel X X X X X
Organic Chemicals X X X X X
TSCA
Asbestos X X X X X
PCBs X X X X
Premanufacture Review X X X
RCRA
Used Oil X X X X X




Data Requirements X X X XTable A-2
(Page 2 of 6)
EPA’s Compliance With EPA And OMB Guidelines For RIAs
Section 2
Identification of Alternatives
Number of Alternatives Identified
Act/Rule Identify Total No Federal Within Market Beyond
Baseline Regulations Scope Oriented Scope
Clean Air Act
NAAQS - N02 X  9 X  3  3  3
NAAQS - PM X 10 10
Surface Coal Mines X 10 X  4  3  3
Heavy Duty Motor Vehicles X  4  4
NAAQS - CO X 10 X  4  3  3
Lead in Fuels X  8  6  2
Clean Water Act
Iron and Steel X 15 13  2
Organic Chemicals X  1  1
TSCA
Asbestos X 10 10
PCBs X  4  4
Premanufacture Review X  4 X  4
RCRA
Used Oil X  4  4
Land Disposal X  3 X  3
CERCLA
Contingency Plan X  2  2
FIFRA
Data Requirements X  9  5  1  3Table A-2
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Act/Rule Identify Ambient Exposure Adverse Monetize
Baseline Impact Effects Benefits
Clean Air Act
NAAQS - N02 X X
NAAQS - PM X X X X X
Surface Coal Mines X X X X X
Heavy Duty Motor Vehicles X X X X
NAAQS - CO X X X X
Lead in Fuels X X X X X
Clean Water Act
Iron and Steel X X X X X
Organic Chemicals X X X X X
TSCA
Asbestos X X X X X
PCBs X X
Premanufacture Review X X
RCRA
Used Oil X X X X
Land Disposal X X
CERCLA
Contingency Plan X X
FIFRA
Data Requirements X X XTable A-2
(page 4 of 6)




Act/Rule  Baseline Real Government Welfare Adjustment
Resource Costs Losses Costs
Clean Air Act
NAAQS - N02 X X X X X
NAAQS - PM X X X
Surface Coal Mines X X
Heavy Duty Motor Vehicles X
NAAQS - CO X X X X X
Lead in Fuels X X
Clean Water Act
Iron and Steel X X
Organic Chemicals X X
TSCA
Asbestos X X X X
PCBs X X
Premanufacture Review X X X
RCRA
Used Oil X X
Land Disposal X X
CERCLA
Contingency Plan X X X X
FIFRA
Data Requirements X X X X XTable A-2
(page 5 of 6)
EPA’s Compliance With EPA And OMB Guidelines For RIAs
Section 5
Evaluation of Net Benefits
Act/Rule Net Benefits Distribution Economic Cost-
Impacts Effectiveness
Clean Air Act
NAAQS - N02 X X
NAAQS - PM X X X
Surface Coal Mines X X
Heavy Duty Motor Vehicles X X
NAAQS - CO X X
Lead in Fuels X X X
Clean Water Act
Iron and Steel X X X
Organic Chemicals X X X
TSCA
Asbestos X X X
PCBs X X X X
Premanufacture Review X X
RCRA
Used Oil X X
Land Disposal X
CERCLA
Contingency Plan X X
FIFRA
Data Requirements XTable A-2
(page 6 of 6)
EPA’s Compliance With EPA And OMB Guidelines For RIAs
Section 6
Rationale for Choosing the Proposed Action
Act/Rule Reasons for Legal Constraints to Statutory
Choosing Action Maximize Benefits Authority
Clean Air Act
NAAQS - N02 X X X
NAAQS - PM X X
Surface Coal Mines X X X
Heavy Duty Motor Vehicles X
NAAQS - CO X X X
Lead in Fuels X X
Clean Water Act
Iron and Steel X X X




Premanufacture Review X X
RCRA
Used Oil X X
Land Disposal X X X
CERCLA
Contingency Plan X X
FIFRA
Data Requirements X X XNAAQS For Nitrogen Dioxide
Regulation
NO  is an air pollutant generated by the oxidation of nitric oxide (NO), which is emitted 2
from both mobile and stationary sources. At elevated concentrations, NO  can adversely affect 2
human health, vegetation, materials, and visibility. Nitrogen oxide compounds (NO ) may also X
contribute to increased rates of acidic deposition.
The Clean Air Act provides authority for EPA to set National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS) for NO . The NO  NAAQS established in 1971 were reviewed and, in 2 2
1984, EPA proposed to retain the existing annual average standards and specifically requested
comment on whether a separate short-term standard is requisite to protect human health.
The Clean Air Act requires that the NAAQS be based on scientific criteria relating to the
level of air quality needed to protect public health and welfare. EPA did not consider the results
of this RIA in selecting the proposed NAAQS.
Regulatory Alternatives
The following alternative approaches to regulation were considered in this RIA:
1. Technology-based emission standards.
2. Regional air quality standards.
3. Alternate stringency levels (ranging from 0.053 ppm to 0.07 ppm), and alternate
implementation schedules.
4. Market-oriented alternatives.
  5. No regulation.
Only alternate stringency levels were studied in detail in this RIA and only they were
considered in the Agency’s development of the standard.
Environmental Effects
A variety of respiratory system effects have been reported to be associated with exposure to
NO  concentrations less than 2.0 ppm in humans and animals, including altered lung function, 2
and respiratory illness and lung tissue damage. Welfare effects of NO  in the atmosphere include 2
materials damage, reduced productivity of crops, reduced visibility, and climate changes. The
revised NO  NAAQS are intended to improve air quality and thereby reduce the above adverse 2
effects.
Benefits
Benefits were not monetized for this RIA; instead, benefits were represented by the
reductions of NO  that are obtained under different NO  standards. 2 2a-2
Costs
This RIA emphasized the direct principal, or real-resource, costs associated with controlling
emission sources of nitrogen oxides (NO ) air pollution in order to attain alternative nitrogen X
dioxide (NO ) NAAQS. Costs were estimated for controls necessary to attain the alternative 2
NAAQS by 1985 and 1990. The costs, in constant 1984 dollars, included inspection and
maintenance of motor vehicle costs (I&M) and stationary source control costs.
Other costs included are those incurred to meet:
l. The Federal Motor Vehicle Control Program (FMVCP) for automobile and truck
NO  controls, as governed by the Clean Air Act; and X
2. New source performance standards (NSPS) for certain new large point sources of
NO  emissions, also governed by CAA. X
The discounted present value of the total estimated nationwide costs for the alternative NO2
NAAQS for 1985 attainment ranged from $1,950 million to $1,840 million for l gpm FMVCP,
$1,730 million to $1,590 million for l.5 gpm FMVCP, and $1,700 million to $1,560 million for
2.0 gpm FMVCP. For 1990 attainment, these costs were $2,670 million for l gpm FMVCP,
$1,750 million for l.5 gpm FMVCP and ranged from $1,640 million to $1,630 million for 2.0
gpm FMVCP.
Benefit-Cost Analysis
A traditional benefit-cost assessment was not made in this RIA. Instead, analyses of the
incremental costs to reduce potentially adverse concentrations of NO  were performed. This was 2
calculated from the incremental control costs and the incremental NO  concentrations resulting 2
from more stringent NO  standards to yield an estimate for the incremental costs per 2
concentration reduction between standards.
The incremental costs per NO  concentration reduction in 1985 ranged from $0 to $17.l 2
million for l.0 gpm FMVCP, $5 to $55 million for l.5 and 2.0 gpm FMVCP; the incremental
costs for 1990 were zero in every case, except for reduction from 0.60 to 0.53 ppm for 2.0 gpm
FMVCP, where they were $2 million.
Distributional Effects
EPA has concluded that the following groups are particularly sensitive to low-level NO2
exposures and therefore would gain the greatest benefit from the control of NO  emissions: X
1. Young children,
2. Asthmatics,
3. Individuals with chronic bronchitis, and
4. Individuals with emphysema and other chronic respiratory diseases.a-3
Economic Impact Analysis
No plant closings were expected due to the installation of NO  controls to meet any of the X
annual average NO  NAAQS. None of the proposed NO  NAAQS would have a significant 2 2
impact on product price, capital availability, or import substitution. At most, a NO  NAAQS 2
would add 0.020% to the cost of producing goods. Also, the average per vehicle cost of I&M for
a failed vehicle – approximately $23 – was not considered a significant increment in the annual
cost of vehicle operation for either the commercial or industrial sectors. The analysis, therefore,
predicted no major changes in industry market structure and no significant effect on small
business entities.
Decision
As a result of its review and revision of the health and welfare criteria associated with NO , 2
EPA promulgated a rule retaining the existing primary and secondary standards of 0.053 ppm as
an annual arithmetic average. The RIA was not considered in the Agency’s decision. The
decision on the need, if any, for a separate short-term standard is being deferred pending the
results from additional research focused on reducing the uncertainties associated with short-term
health effects.NAAQS For Particulate Matter
Regulation
Particulate matter (PM) represents a broad class of diverse substances that exist as discrete
particles and are emitted to the atmosphere from a wide variety of sources. At elevated
concentrations PM can adversely affect human health and welfare.
The Clean Air Act provides authority for EPA to set National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS) for PM. The PM NAAQS established in 1971 were reviewed and new
NAAQS were proposed in 1984.
The Clean Air Act requires that the NAAQS be based on scientific criteria relating to the
level of air quality needed to protect public health and welfare. EPA did not consider the results
of this RIA in selecting the proposed NAAQS.
Regulatory Alternatives
In reviewing the PM NAAQS, EPA considered a range of ambient concentrations for PM10.
PM10 refers to particles with an aerodynamic diameter less than or equal to 10 um. The ambient
levels considered for PM10 included both a range of annual arithmetic means from 48 to 70
ug/m  and a range of 24-hour expected 2nd maximum values from no standard to 150 to 250
3
ug/m . The existing standards for Total Suspended Particulates (TSP) were also considered.
3
Environmental Effects
Scientific research suggests that reducing ambient PM concentrations would have beneficial
effects both on human health and on the physical environment. Reduced PM concentrations may
lead to reductions primarily in the incidences of respiratory and cardiovascular diseases. Also,
reduced PM concentrations may lead to less soiling of property, less acidic deposition, and an
improvement in visibility.
Benefits
EPA used existing health and welfare studies to obtain information about the benefits of
reducing PM concentrations. Benefit estimates were included for all categories of effects for
which adequate studies were available. In aggregating the benefits across the various categories
of effects EPA used six different aggregation procedures (A-F). Aggregation procedures A and
B were based only on those studies which had gone through the Criteria Document and CASAC
review process and were found to provide quantitative evidence of effects. The other procedures
incorporated progressively more studies and consequently more benefit categories, even though
some of these studies were exposed to lesser degrees of review or consensus.
The effects considered in the benefit estimates for aggregation procedure A and B included
reductions in human mortality and morbidity. The aggregation procedures C and D added the
benefits of reduced soiling and material damage in the household sector. Aggregation procedures
E and F added the benefits of reduced soiling and material damage in the manufacturing sector.
For several categories of effects, such as soiling and materials damage in the other sectors,b-2
adequate studies could not be identified. These categories of effects were not included in the
benefit estimates.
The benefits of the alternative PM NAAQS were aggregated from the estimated attainment
dates (1987 or 1989) through 1995 and were monetized using two estimates ($0.36 and $2.80) of
the value of a unit reduction of 1.0 x 10  in annual mortality risk. These estimates were
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provided as a range of estimates from studies of what individuals are willing to pay for such a
reduction in mortality risk. The total estimated benefits ranged from about $0.5 - $6.0 billion for
aggregation procedure A to about $40 - $270 billion for aggregation procedure F.
Costs
Costs for the alternative PM NAAQS were estimated by preparing a list of control options
and associated costs for each source in those counties projected to be in nonattainment. Where
the control strategies did not result in full attainment, the additional cost of attainment was
estimated by extrapolation using average national costs.
The discounted present value of the total estimated nationwide costs for the alternative PM
NAAQS ranged from $1.4 billion to 11.0 billion.
Benefit-Cost Analysis
The benefits and costs for each alternative PM NAAQS were aggregated to yield estimated
net incremental benefits. Using aggregation procedure A the net benefits were negative for all of
the alternatives when the lower value of reducing mortality risk was used and ranged up to about
$1 billion using the higher value of reducing mortality risk. Using aggregation procedure F the
net benefits ranged from about $40 - $260 billion.
Distributional Effects
The benefits of reduced PM concentrations were found to vary considerably among different
regions of the country. Particularly large shares of the benefits were noted in Regions V (East
North Central), VI (South Central) and IX (South Pacific). The share of the benefits changes
depending on the aggregation procedure used. For example, Procedure A for the PM10 (70/250
ug/m ) standard suggests that 54% of the benefits would occur in Region IX. Under Procedure
3
E, the share for Region IX falls to 32% and is exceeded by the 35% share in Region V.
Economic Impact Analysis
The most stringent PM NAAQS resulted in the imposition of costs on some 200 industries.
Because it was not feasible to complete an economic analysis of all affected industries, sixteen
industries that were judged particularly vulnerable to these costs were analyzed.
The incremental costs of the most expensive PM NAAQS alternative were applied to pro
forma income statements and balance sheets developed for model plants in each industry. For 10
of the 16 industries, absorption of the control costs with no price changes or net adjustment tob-3
production was projected to result. Firms in the remaining industries were judged able to pass
through a significant portion of the control costs resulting in price increases ranging from 0.6%
to 7.0% with resulting net decreases in production no greater than 1.0%. Although the impacts
were found to vary by industry, the analysis forecast neither major change in production or
industry structure, nor a significant effect on a substantial number of small business entities.
Decision
As a result of the review and revision of the health and welfare effects associated with PM,
EPA proposed to replace TSP and PM10 as an indicator for the primary PM NAAQS. The RIA
was not considered by the Agency in formulating the proposal. The 24-hour primary NAAQS
was proposed to be selected from a range of 150 to 250 ug/m  and the annual primary standard
3
was proposed to be selected from a range of 50 to 65 ug/m  expressed as an annual arithmetic
3
mean. A 24-hour secondary NAAQS was proposed to be selected from a range of 70 to 90
ug/m3 of TSP expressed as an annual arithmetic mean. The Administrator invited comments and
information from the public for consideration in promulgating the specific levels for each of the
standards.Surface Coal Mines For New Source Review
Regulation
EPA has various rules that regulate the construction of new stationary sources of air
pollution and modifications in existing sources. EPA has proposed to list surface coal mines
(SCMs) as a source category subject to the new Source Review (NSR) provisions of the Clean
Air Act (CAA). This action would limit particulate matter (PM) emissions of SCMs and result in
reductions in PM concentrations beyond those that can be achieved under the existing or revised
PM National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) and state regulations. PM represents a
broad class of diverse substances that exist as discrete particles. At elevated concentrations, PM
can adversely affect human health and welfare.
The CAA allows for the consideration of economics as one of the criteria in making a final
decision with regard to the proposed rulemaking.
Regulatory Alternatives
Alternative I: No further regulations beyond PM NAAQS and state regulations.
Alternative II: Would affect SCMs starting construction after promulgation of the
regulation; existing SCMs would be exempted from NSR.
Alternative III: Would affect new and existing SCMs that started construction after January
6, 1975.
Alternative IV: As major sources, mines would be subject to the CAA’s prevention of
significant deterioration (PSD) increments. Allowable CAA and State PSD
increments include Class I through III designations, which represent
increasing levels of air quality degradation that are allowable. Alternative IV
would affect only those SCMs whose operations would have ambient
impacts on Class I and mandatory Class II lands.
Other alternatives required to be considered by E.O. 12291 included:
1. No additional regulation.
2. Regulations beyond the scope of present legislation.
3. Market-oriented approaches.
4. Alternative stringency levels.
Statutory requirements preclude consideration of 1, 2 and 4. This RIA did not attempt to
identify optional strategies that states may undertake to comply with alternative regulations.
Environmental Effects
Reducing ambient PM concentrations has been found to have beneficial effects both on
human health and on the physical environment. Human health is improved by reductions in the
incidences of cancer and of respiratory and cardiovascular diseases. Reduced PM concentrations
also lead to less soiling of property, less acidic deposition, and an improvement in visibility.c-2
To estimate improvements in air quality due to regulation, baseline PM concentrations
associated with individual mines were computed and dispersion modeling was then performed to
obtain maximum off-site concentrations contributed by a mine. The difference between the
baseline off-site concentration and the PSD increment was then determined to yield the level of
air quality improvement attributable to the alternative regulations.
Under Alternative II, annual average PM concentrations were estimated to decrease between
zero and 33.9 ug/m , while 24-hour concentrations decreased between zero and 84.0 ug/m .
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Under Alternative III, the annual average improvement ranged from 3.2 ug/m  and 51.1 ug/m .
3 3
The range for the 24-hour improvements was 0.3 to 57.1 ug/m . Under Alternative IV, visibility
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in Class I and mandatory Class II was estimated to improve from 0.5 to 18.2 miles.
Benefits
EPA used existing health and welfare studies to obtain information about the benefits of
reducing PM concentrations. The benefit estimates in this RIA represented the incremental
improvement in going from an air quality level due to PM NAAQS regulations to an air quality
level consistent with PSD increments.
Benefit categories analyzed included morbidity, mortality, household soiling and materials
damage, visual range and plumeblight. Benefits for these categories were quantified by
measuring individuals’ willingness-to-pay (WTP) for cleaner air. Ranges of benefits for new
mines were calculated by making alternative assumptions with regard to the population exposed.
The range of benefits for five basins analyzed under Alternative II was $25,200 to $815,900,
estimated for 1995. The range of benefit estimates, for Alternative III, also for 1995, was only
for the Powder River Basin and was from $109,000 to $242,200. (Under Alternative II, the
Powder River benefits ranged from zero to $33,200.) The benefit ranges for Alternative IV were
zero to $303,200 and zero to $13,600 for Bryce Canyon National Park (for 1996), and Chaco
Culture National Historic Park (for 1989), respectively. (Under Alternative 4, only benefits
related to visibility were measured because neither park had large enough permanent populations
to generate residential benefits.) Benefits were measured in 1983 dollars using a 10% discount
rate.
Costs
Engineering costs associated with air quality improvement over and above the costs of
current control programs were calculated in this RIA for individual mines. Emission control
costs were estimated by costing-out additional equipment. A surface mine production cost model
was used to compute changes in the cost of production arising from forced reductions in output
rates.
Under Alternative II, mine cost increases ranged from zero to $5.51 per ton of coal
produced. For Alternative III, engineering costs ranged from $0.015 to $0.81 per ton of coal.
Since mines were not expected to locate near Class I and mandatory Class II areas under
Alternative IV, no engineering cost estimates were expected.c-3
Benefit-Cost Analysis
The benefit-cost analysis described comparisons across alternatives on the basis of
incremental benefits and incremental costs. For Alternative II, the largest incremental net benefit
was $-4.6 million for the five basins; for Alternative III, the largest incremental net benefit was
$-5.7 million for the Power River Basin. (For the Power River Basin, maximum incremental net
benefits under Alternative II were estimated to be $-199,000.) Under Alternative IV, the
maximum benefits in the two areas studied were about $300,000. Alternative IV is therefore the
most economically efficient alternative.
Distributional Effects
All new mines were assumed to locate in isolation and away from existing populations. The
hypothetical population that was expected to be affected by PM emissions of mines included
mine employees, their families, employees of secondary businesses supporting the mining
activity and families of these latter employees.
Economic Impact Analysis
Economic impacts measured in this RIA included market price, changes in production rates
and social costs of the alternatives. As the alternative regulations impose costs on new SCMs
entering the market, market prices increase, surface production declines and deep coal
production increases in basins where the two technologies compete. The market price increases
caused by adopting Alternative II ranged from zero to $4.87 per ton of coal.
The price impacts of Alternative III ranged from $0.01 to $0.75 per ton (Powder River price
impacts would be the same under either alternative). Alternative IV was asserted to have no
impacts on any regional market or on the national level.
Price increases would lead to reduced basin output of surface mined coal. Under Alternative
II, these reductions would range from 2.6 to 29.5 million tons of surface coal summed across all
basins analyzed. Reduced surface coal output in the Power River Basin under both Alternatives
II and III ranged from 0.1 to 5.3 million tons of coal. In the two eastern basins analyzed under
Alternative II, underground coal production would go up, ranging from increases of l.6 to 13.5
million tons.
Social costs represent increased costs of production due to regulation and costs associated
with decreases in coal production due to price increases. The social cost estimate of Alternative
II ranged from $5.4 million to $68.2 million. Under Alternative III, the Powder River Basin
social costs ranged from $5.9 million to $15.5 million. (Under Alternative II, Powder River
social costs ranged from $0.2 million to $11.6 million.)
Regulation will primarily affect large mining operations and will not have a significant
impact on a substantial number of small entities.c-4
Decision
EPA has proposed to add surface coal mines to the current list of 30 categories of sources
subject to the New Source Review provisions of the Clean Air Act. None of the alternatives
presented in this RIA has yet been chosen by EPA for promulgation. The Administrator has
invited comments and information from the public for consideration in promulgating a final rule.
This RIA was prepared for use in assisting the Administrator in making his decision on the
final action on listing SCMs.Heavy Duty Motor Vehicles
Regulation
The final rule associated with this RIA regulates, for 1988 and later model years, the level of
emissions of nitrogen oxides from light-duty trucks (LDTs) and heavy-duty engines (HDEs) and
the level of particulate emissions from heavy-duty diesel engines (HDDEs). The lower level of
NO  and PM in the ambient air attained by this regulation (compared to uncontrolled emissions) X
is anticipated to have a beneficial effect on human health and welfare.
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 created a statutory heavy-duty vehicle class and
established mandatory emissions reductions for that class. Under the amendments, all
heavy-duty vehicles were required to achieve a 75 percent reduction in NOx emissions from
uncontrolled levels, effective with the 1985 model year. The Act also authorized the
Administrator to temporarily establish revised NO  standards for heavy-duty engines if the X
statutory standards could not be achieved without increasing cost or decreasing fuel economy to
an “excessive and unreasonable degree.”
The Amendments of 1977 also required the “greatest degree of particulate emission
reduction achievable,” given the availability of control technology and considering cost,
leadtime and energy impacts. These reductions were to begin in the 1981 model year. The
heavy-duty diesel engine particulate standards in this rulemaking were based on this authority.
Technological feasibility was the primary basis for the decision in this rulemaking because of
the statutory provisions governing both the NO  and particulate standards. Cost effectiveness X
was a lesser consideration in deciding among control options.
Regulatory Alternatives
A range of alternative emissions standards were considered for LDTs, HDEs and HDDEs.
Technical difficulty, cost, and cost effectiveness values were determined for each alternative.
Environmental Effects
EPA used a “rollback model” to predict future air quality: In this approach, any change in
emissions was assumed to translate proportionately into a change in ambient pollutant
concentrations. The final rule’s standards for NO  emissions were tested in eight low-altitude X
urban areas resulting in 5% lower ambient concentrations of NO  than base case predictions in 2
1990 and 11% lower in 1995. In two high-altitude urban areas, NO  concentrations were 4% 2
lower than for the base case in 1990 and 11% lower in 1995.
Diesel particulate emissions are almost exclusively composed of fine particulates and,
because they occur at ground level, lead to high ambient concentrations. Current ambient diesel
particulate concentrations in large cities are projected to grow from an average of 1-3 ug/m  to
3
levels of 3-7 ug/m  by the year 2000 with no further control on HDDEs. With the standards
3
promulgated in the final rule, diesel particulate concentrations in large cities will be reduced to
1.5-4 ug/m , a reduction to almost half of baseline concentrations.
3d-2
It has been determined that reducing ambient concentrations of NO  will reduce the 2
incidence of human respiratory problems. Reducing ambient diesel PM concentrations will
lower the risks of cancer and non-cancer health problems; diesel PM reduction will also lead to
improved visibility and reduced soiling of property.
Benefits
Because of a court-imposed deadline, the Office of Mobile Sources did not include in the
final RIA those sections of the draft RIA that remained unchanged. However, the final RIA
makes clear that these sections are meant to be part of the total economic analysis within its
purview. These sections include a benefit-cost analysis of HDDE PM emissions.
Health and welfare benefits for a .25 g/BHP-hr particulate standard totaled $6625 million,
and for a .10 g/BHP-hr standard totaled $9455 million. (These values are in 1983 dollars and
represent the 1987-2000 interval.)
Annual benefits were also calculated for all six HDDE particulate control options under
consideration. The benefits ranged across alternatives for a lower bound of $117 million and an
upper bound of $1977 million to a lower bound of $240 million and an upper bound of $4082
million.
Costs
The aggregate costs to the nation of the HDE NO  and particulate standards included the X
total manufacturer costs of research, development and testing (RD&T), hardware, and user costs
of fuel economy and maintenance incurred as a result of the standards. These costs were
estimated to be $118-600 million for the 1988 standards, $833-1,241 million for the 1991
standards, and $336-394 million for the 1994 standards, discounted at 10% to each of those
years.
The control costs for particulate emissions of PM were calculated separately as part of the
benefit-cost analysis of particulate control. For the .25 g/BHP-hr standard, the lower bound cost
was $1788 million and the upper-bound $2986 million, for the .10 g/BHP-hr standard, the lower
bound was $2554 million, the upper bound $4266 million. (These values are in 1983 dollars and
represent the 1987-2000 interval.)
Annual costs were also calculated for all six HDDE particulate control options under
consideration. These costs ranged across alternatives from a lower bound of $113 million and an
upper bound of $189 million to a lower bound of $347 million and an upper bound of $579
million.
Benefit-Cost Analysis
EPA determined the cost-effectiveness of the proposed standards in terms of the dollar cost
per ton of particulate or NO  emissions controlled over and above less stringent options. These X
values were used to make comparisons with the cost-effectiveness of other mobile andd-3
non-mobile source control strategies. The costs represent the net present value in the year of sale
to the consumer, using a 10% discount rate. Cost-effectiveness analysis of the NO  standards for X
LDTs yielded a $405/ton figure, $35/ton for HDE option of 6.0 g/BHP-hr in 1988 and
$58-122/ton for the HDE option of 6.0 g/BHP-hr in 1988 and 5.0 g/BHP-hr in 1991. For the
diesel PM standards, the cost-effectiveness figure for the option of .60 g/BHP-hr in 1988 was
$2710/ton, for the option of .60 g/BHP-hr. in 1988 and option of .60g/BHP-hr in 1988, .25
g/BHP-hr in 1991 and .10g/BHP-hr in 1994, the figure was $10,300-11,900/ton. All of the
above figures assume a 10% discount rate for the calculation of tons of PM reduced.
Benefit-cost analyses were performed for six regulatory options for particulate emissions
from heavy-duty vehicles. The net benefits ranged across alternatives from a lower bound of
-$74 million and an upper bound of $1863 million to a lower bound of -$339 million and an
upper bound of $3735 million.
Cost-effectiveness figures were also obtained for other mobile source control alternatives for
NO  and PM as well as for stationary source control alternatives for PM. Based on these X
analyses, the final standards appear to be a relatively cost-effective means of reducing particulate
and NO  emissions compared to controlling these pollutants from other sources. X
Distributional Effects
Because emissions of NOx and PM result in different ambient concentrations at high and low
altitudes, high and low altitude areas are considered separately when developing emission
standards.
Economic Impact Analysis
Besides the costs mentioned above incurred by industry and vehicle purchasers as a result of
the HDE NOx and particulate standards, the original draft RIA discussed the effects on
manufacturer sales and cash flow, the regional effects of employment, and the national effects on
energy usage, balance of trade and inflation. The final RIA does not go over the results of these
analyses, but does review some comments received from individuals and organizations. EPA
agrees with these comments that the costs of regulation will be passed on to the consumer in
terms of price increases but deems that these costs will be considered worthwhile, considering
the benefits incurred of improved environment and public health.
Comments were received pertaining to the impact of the rule on urban transit buses. EPA
estimated that the costs borne by these transit systems, at approximately 5% increase in first
price and 2% increase in operating and maintenance costs, would not be severe and there should
be no significant fare increases or ridership losses.
There is no analysis in the final RIA of the effects of the rule on small business entities.d-4
Decision
EPA’s new oxides of nitrogen emission standards for 1988 and later model year LDTs are
1.2 or 1.7 g/mile, depending on vehicle test weight; for 1988 and later model year HDEs, 6.0
g/BHP-hr (the D.C. Circuit Court has since ruled (Nov. 7, 1986) that this standard cannot take
effect until 1990); and for 1991 and later model year HDEs, 5.0 g/BHP-hr. The new particulate
emissions standards, which apply only to HDDEs, are .60 g/BHP-hr for 1988 and later model
years, .25 g/BHP-hr (.10 g/BHP-hr for urban buses) for 1991 and later model years, and .10
g/BHP-hr for 1994 and later model years. Emissions averaging, of both particulate and NOX
emissions from HDEs, is allowed beginning with the 1991 model year. Averaging of NOX
emissions from LDTs is allowed beginning in 1988. Comments on inter-company trading of
HDT emissions of NOx and PM were solicited as a possible future regulatory initiative.
EPA held two public hearings following the proposal of NO  and particulate standards and X
invited comments, which were reviewed and incorporated into the final RIA.NAAQS for CO
Regulation
Carbon monoxide is a colorless, odorless gas that is toxic to mammals, causing deficient
oxygenation of the blood, which leads to malfunction of cardiovascular, central nervous,
pulmonary and other body systems. Low-level CO exposures have been shown to cause
aggravation of cardiovascular diseases.
The Clean Air Act provides authority for EPA to set National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS) for CO. Primary and secondary CO NAAQS established in 1971 were
reviewed and new NAAQS were proposed in 1980. Since CO at the level found in the ambient
air does not have any adverse effects on vegetation or the public welfare, EPA is revoking the
existing secondary standard. Consequently, this RIA focused on the primary standards only.
The Clean Air Act requires that the NAAQS be based on scientific criteria relating to the
level of air quality needed to protect public health and welfare. EPA did not consider the results
of this RIA in selecting the proposed NAAQS.
Regulatory Alternatives
Executive Order 12291 requires that at a minimum, the following regulatory alternatives be
examined:
1. No regulation.
2. Regulations beyond the scope of present legislation.
3. Market oriented alternatives.
4. Alternative stringency levels and implementation schedules.
Because of legislative constraints, only alternative stringency levels were analyzed in detail
in this RIA. These alternative CO levels for the 8-hour primary standard ranged from 9ppm to
15ppm.
Environmental Effects
Reducing ambient CO concentrations would have beneficial effects on human health.
Low-level exposure to CO can cause aggravation of angina and other cardiovascular diseases
and can have adverse effects on the central nervous system.
Benefits
Benefits were not monetized for this RIA; instead, benefits were represented by the number
of occurrences of carboxyhemoglobin (COHb) levels of 2.1 percent or higher among American
adults with cardiovascular disease. These numbers were derived by linking up the Coburn model
with outputs of the national exposure model to estimate COHb distributions in sensitive adults
that would be exposed to various ambient CO levels under the alternative standards. These
numbers ranged from 12,570 occurrences under the 9 ppm standard to 15,476,000 occurrences
under the 15 ppm standard.e-2
Costs
This RIA emphasized the direct principal, or real-resource, costs associated with controlling
emission sources of CO air pollution in order to attain alternative CO NAAQS. This RIA
discussed the cost estimate for NAAQS attainment by 1995. The costs, in constant 1984 dollars,
are those associated with reasonably available control measures (RACM), which form the basis
for the state implementation plans which are developed to attain and maintain NAAQS. RACM
include inspection and maintenance programs for automobiles (I & M), transportation control
measures (TCM) and point source-oriented technologies. However, since the RACM does not
result in full attainment of the CO NAAQS, four additional alternative control strategies were
investigated.
These resulted in annual costs ranging across alternative ambient CO concentration standards
from $44 - 58 million to $261 - 338 million.
Benefit-Cost Analysis
A traditional benefit-cost assessment was not made in this RIA. Instead, analyses of the
incremental costs and of reduced potentially adverse exposures to CO were performed instead.
Costs associated with the four alternative standards were analyzed along with reductions in the
number of sensitive people with COHb levels exceeding 2.1 percent and reductions in the
number of occurrences of COHb levels exceeding 2.1 percent. The incremental costs per
exposure reduction ranged from $47 - $72 to $7,980 - $14,500 per reduction in the number of
cardiovascular adults exceeding 2.1 percent COHb and ranged from $4 - $6 to $3,140 - $5,850
per reduction in the number of occurrences of COHb levels exceeding 2.1 percent.
Distributional Effects
EPA has identified persons with angina or other types of cardiovascular disease as the groups
at greatest risk from low-level, ambient exposures to CO. Other susceptible groups include: 
1. Persons with chronic respiratory disease.
2. Elderly individuals, especially those with reduced cardiopulmonary function.
3. Fetuses and young infants.
4. Persons suffering from anemia and/or those with abnormal hemoglobin types that
affect oxygen carrying capacity or transport in the blood.
Economic Impact Analysis
No plant closings or significant unemployment impacts were predicted due to the installation
of CO controls. None of the proposed CO NAAQS would have a significant impact on product
price, capital availability, or import substitution. For large industrial sources, CO capital
expenditures would be, at most, 8 percent of projected capital expenditures, resulting in pricee-3
changes of no more than 0.5 percent. The analysis, therefore, predicted no major changes in
industry market structure and no effect on small business entities.
Decision
As a result of its review of the health and welfare criteria associated with CO, EPA decided
to retain the existing primary (health) standards for CO established in 1971, of 9 parts per
million (ppm) for the 8-hour average and 35ppm for the 1-hour average, and revoked the
existing secondary (welfare) standards. The Agency did not consider the RIA in reaching this
decision.Lead in Gasoline
Regulation
The EPA is regulating the level of lead in gasoline in order to minimize the adverse health
and environmental effects of subsequent ambient air lead levels and of increased emissions of
other pollutants due to catalytic converters damaged by leaded gasoline. The Clean Air Act
provides authority for EPA to control a fuel additive if its emission products cause or contribute
to air pollution endangering “the public health or welfare…or impairing…the performance of
any emission control device or system…in general use.”
The benefits and costs of alternative lead phasedown rules were included among the
considerations made in setting the final standard.
Regulatory Alternatives
In reviewing the lead in gasoline standard, EPA considered a range of alternative phasedown
schedules. These alternatives included both different lead levels and different effective dates.
Market-oriented alternatives to regulation were also considered.
Environmental Effects
Lead in gasoline has been shown to increase blood lead levels, which in turn have been
linked to a variety of serious health effects. Exposure to high levels of lead in the air may lead to
severe retardation, kidney disease, and even death; lower levels of lead provoke biochemical
changes, with uncertain implications for health. Particular concern has focused on children, who
appear to be at greater risk. A reduction in the level of lead in gasoline will significantly reduce
the incidence of these health problems. Also as a result of the lead standard, excess emissions of
hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide and nitrogen oxides that result from misfueling will be reduced
to the extent that misfueling is reduced. Other benefits of the lead in gasoline standard include
vehicle maintenance savings, improved fuel economy, and increased engine durability.
Benefits
Monetized benefits of the final rule were estimated for three categories: (1) Children’s health
benefits associated with reduced lead exposure; (2) Benefits from reduced emissions of
hydrocarbons, nitrogen oxides, and carbon monoxide from misfueled vehicles; and (3)
Maintenance and fuel economy savings. In each category, estimates did not cover all the likely
benefits, because of gaps in the data or difficulty in monetizing some types of benefits.
1. Benefits from reduced lead exposure in children included estimates of medical costs
averted, amounting to $155 million in 1986. Estimates were also made of
compensatory education costs averted for children experiencing learning difficulties
due to elevated blood lead levels; for 1986, these benefits amounted to $447 million.
2. Benefits from reducing emissions of pollutants other than Lead were estimated using
two methods. The first method used direct estimates of health and welfare effects, e.g.,f-2
the effects of ozone (formed by HC and NO ) on agricultural crop losses and on days X
lost from work due to respiratory symptoms; these benefits ranged in 1986 from a low
estimate of $113 million to a high estimate of $305 million, with a point estimate of
$171 million. The second method used the cost of pollution equipment destroyed by
misfueling, yielding an estimate of $385 million saved for 1986. The final estimate
was based on an average of these two methods.
3. Assuming no misfueling, the estimates of maintenance benefits were $933 million for
1986. Estimates of fuel economy savings, mostly due to higher fuel density, were
$190 million for 1986.
Costs
A reduction in the standard from 1.10 grams of lead per gallon of gasoline (gplg) to 0.50
gplg, effective in July 1985, raised the cost of producing an octane-barrel of gasoline from 15.8
cents to 20.4 cents. (An octane-barrel is defined as raising the octane of a barrel of gasoline by 1
point.) Annually, the cost to the industry is $96 million. A standard of 0.10 gplg effective
January 1, 1986 will cost the industry $3.4 billion for the period 1986-92.
Benefit-Cost Analysis
The benefits and costs for alternative lead level standards were aggregated to yield estimated
net benefits. Assuming no misfueling starting in 1985, the net benefits of the proposed rule for
the period 1985-92 were estimated to be $6.7 billion. The benefits calculated do not include
benefits from averting elevated blood pressure in adults due to elevated blood lead levels,
because studies establishing this link are too recent to allow widespread review. Whether or not
blood pressure data was used, and whether or not it was assumed that the rule would eliminate
misfueling, the results showed that the final phasedown rule had the highest net benefits of the
alternatives considered.
Distributional Effects
Harmful effects to human health due to elevated blood lead levels occur in all segments of
the population but are most prevalent in children. Blood lead levels are higher in summer than in
winter; the gasoline lead variable that best correlates with blood lead is gasoline sales for the
preceding month.
To determine regional differences in industry costs, the national model of costs was
disaggregated by geographic location. It was found that the rule would cause fewer operating
constraints in the West Coast, Alaska and Hawaii than in the rest of the country as the rule
generates lower operating rates and marginal costs for producing octane in these areas.f-3
Economic Impact Analysis
EPA used the Department of Energy linear programming model of the refining industry to
estimate the costs of complying with the lead phasedown rule. This model estimated that at
current lead levels (1.10 gplg) the increase in manufacturing costs between leaded and unleaded
gasoline was less than 2 cents per gallon. Retail prices diverged by an average of about 7 cents
per gallon. This large discrepancy reflects marketing strategies within the retail industry rather
than real social costs, defined as the costs of real resources such as extra capital and labor.
Increases in manufacturing costs were moderated in 1985 by the option for industry to use
marketable “lead credits.” Under the 1.10 gplg limit, industries with lower than average costs to
produce octane without lead were allowed to reduce their lead content below the limit and to sell
the excess lead rights to refiners with higher than average costs, who could then produce
gasoline with lead content above the limit. This production of lead rights was allowed to
continue under the interim .50 gplg limit but prohibited when the .10 gplg standard came into
effect on January 1, 1986; however, use of existing lead rights is permitted through December
31, 1987.
The cost to industry of the final rule with banking was calculated in the RIA to be lower than
the cost of the proposed rule without banking. The Agency determined that per unit costs of
complying with the rule would be somewhat higher for smaller refineries, particularly those with
less modern equipment.
Decision
As a result of its analysis of the health, economic, energy, and air quality impacts of
regulation, EPA promulgated a low-lead standard of 0.10 gplg effective January 1, 1986, while
an interim standard of 0.50 gplg went into effect July 1, 1985. The standard of 0.10 gplg was
established based on the conclusion that such an amount of lead would be adequate to protect
engines at risk from the problem of valveseat recession and that such an effective date would be
feasible for the refining industry as a whole. The 0.50 gplg standard was promulgated as it was
deemed attainable by the refining industry. Considering these factors, the effective dates of these
two standards were also deemed to maximize the net benefits of the standards.
Benefits and costs of the proposed rule, as calculated in the RIA, were considered in setting
the two standards: the benefits were shown to substantially exceed the costs, whatever the
predicted impact of reduced misfueling.
EPA held a public hearing on the proposed rulemaking and invited written comments before
going ahead with promulgation.Iron and Steel
Regulation
The rule, of May 1982, associated with this RIA defines effluent limitation guidelines for the
iron and steel industry. The purpose of this regulation was to specify effluent limitations for
“best practicable technology” (BPT), “best available technology” (BAT), “best conventional
technology” (BCT), and “new source performance standards” (NSPS) for direct dischargers and
to establish pretreatment standards for indirect dischargers.
Monetary benefits were not considered in the final rule.
Regulatory Alternatives
EPA evaluated a number of alternative wastewater treatment technologies to form the basis
of the final limitations. The Agency weighed the costs of industrial compliance with each of
these alternatives and the derived effluent reduction benefits.
EPA also evaluated alternatives to the concept of uniform national effluent limits based on
available technology. These alternatives included allowing waivers from national standards
based on economic or local water quality considerations, establishing a single effluent limitation
which would apply to a number of discharge pipes within one plant or even to a number of
plants (the “bubble” concept), and using receiving water quality standards rather than a
technology basis for establishing individual effluent limitations beyond those already in effect.
The iron and steel regulation does allow for the bubble concept to be applied across discharge
pipes within one facility. Each of the other alternatives could not be legally implemented unless
the Clean Water Act is modified. The RIA did not include a discussion of the costs and benefits
of the alternatives to uniform effluent limits based on available technology.
Environmental Effects
The end result of the industry’s failure to control pollution was the severely degraded
condition of many rivers and streams during the early 1960’s. Federal, State, and local
regulatory programs have since caused the cleanup of the most visible problems; however, many
streams are still adversely affected by pollutant discharges. The loadings of toxic materials from
the iron and steel industry are among the highest of all major industrial categories regulated by
the EPA. This regulation was intended to reduce the industry’s toxic pollutant discharges from
19,500 lbs/day to about 10,500 lbs/day with full implementation of BPT and to about 2,300
lbs/day with implementation of BAT. The subsequent improvement in water quality of the
stream segments receiving discharges from iron and steel facilities would result in increased
recreation opportunities and improved aesthetic conditions.g-2
Benefits
EPA attempted to quantify the benefits of this regulation using two approaches: 
1. A specific analysis of the benefits attributable to the regulation for three individual
stream segments; and
2. The allocation of shares of the aggregate benefits of water pollution control to the
BPT and BAT effluent guidelines for the steel industry. 
The benefits of water pollution control are generally classified into four categories:
1. Recreation benefits;
2. Nonuser benefits;
3. Human health benefits; and
4. Diversionary uses and commercial fisheries benefits.
The Agency’s case study analysis concentrated on the first two categories because these
categories were expected to constitute a significant portion of the total benefits for the stream
segments studied.
1. On the Black River in Northern Ohio, the annual benefits were expected to range from
$2.2 - 7.3 million (in 1981 dollars).
2. On the Mahoning River in eastern Ohio and southwestern Pennsylvania, the
annualized benefits were expected to range from $2.3 - 12.1 million.
3. On the lower Monongahela River in southwestern Pennsylvania, the annual benefits
were expected to range from $13.2 - 30.3 million.
To estimate national aggregate benefits of water pollution control, the Agency synthesized a
range of aggregate benefit estimates. The Agency pointed out that these estimates were
imprecise because, in some cases, the effects of relevant pollutants had been omitted. The
estimates also did not account in most cases for the impacts of nonpoint sources of pollution. In
contrast to the case studies described above, this aggregate benefits calculation was based on
more limited data.
At the time this RIA was written, in March 1982, the iron and steel industry was responsible
for 6.5% of all discharges for the pollutant categories for which data were available. Applying
this loadings percentage, the total annual benefits of complete abatement of iron and steel
effluent, from a 1972 loadings baseline, were calculated to range between $320 million to $4.95
billion. The share of this amount due to BPT and BAT loadings reduction relative to discharge
levels current at the time this RIA was written ranged from a total of $35.9 - 727.7 million.g-3
Costs
The following figures are in 1981 dollars.
1. On the Black River, the annualized compliance costs were projected at $2.7 - 3.2
million.
2. On the Mahoning River, the annualized compliance costs were projected at $4.2 - 5.5
million.
3. On the Monongahela River, the annualized compliance costs were projected at $3.7 -
7.1 million.
The estimated annual compliance costs of complete abatement from the 1972 level of the
BPT and BAT loadings share of the iron and steel industry discharges ranged from $46.3 - 48.5
million.
Also, EPA calculated the costs of alternative wastewater treatment technologies for each of
the subcategories. As in all other effluent limitations guidelines regulations, this analysis formed
an important basis for selecting appropriate control technologies.
Benefit-Cost Analysis
Benefit-cost analysis was not conducted for alternative wastewater treatment technologies;
only costs were determined for each subcategory. Benefit-cost analysis was also not conducted
for alternatives to uniform national effluent limits based on available technology.
Benefit-cost analysis was done for the proposed standards. The results from the first
approach delineated in the benefits section were that, for two of the stream segments (the
Mahoning and Black Rivers), the estimated costs were within the range of the estimated benefits
but were near the lower end of the range. For the Monongahela River, the estimated costs were
less than the lower bound of the estimated benefits range. For all 3 streams combined, the range
of estimated annual costs was $10.8 million to $15.8 million, while the range of estimated
annual benefits was $17.7 million to $49.7 million.
The results of the second approach were that the total costs of the iron and steel effluent
guidelines regulation were near the lower bound of the range of estimated benefits.
All of the benefits estimates used in this analysis contained a large degree of uncertainty.
Nevertheless, the analysis did indicate there was a high probability that the societal benefits of
the regulation would significantly outweigh the costs.
Cost effectiveness studies were conducted on various regulatory alternatives on both and
intra- and inter-industry basis. Cost effectiveness is defined as the incremental annualized cost
associated with a pollution control option in an industry or industry subcategory divided by the
incremental “pounds equivalent” of pollutant removed. Within the industry, the results of the
analysis showed that, for subcategories where a BAT option other than BPT was selected, the
selected option was the most cost-effective one.g-4
A cost effectiveness analysis was done of pollutant removals in the iron and steel industry as
compared to other industries: of the seven industries for which BAT limitations had been
proposed, the iron and steel regulation was more cost-effective than all except one.
Distributional Effects
Distributional effects of regulation were not discussed in this RIA.
Economic Impact Analysis
Using two scenarios for future demand for domestically produced steel products, EPA
estimated that the economic impact of the regulation would be relatively small (under either
scenario). The incremental costs resulting from the regulation would result in incremental
short-run changes in price, production, market share, and employment totaling about 0.6% or
less from their 1985 baseline levels. By the early 1900’s, there would be virtually no impact
under either scenario, except for a 0.6% increase in price.
 
Decision
EPA issued, in May 1982, effluent limitations for “best practicable technology,” “best
available technology,” “best conventional technology,” and “new source performance standards”
for direct discharges and established pretreatment standards for indirect dischargers. EPA invited
comments and held meetings with representatives of the industry and other members of the
public before promulgating the rule.
EPA promulgated modifications to this rule in May 1984.Organics and Plastics
Regulation
The Agency proposed effluent limitations guidelines and standards for the organic
chemicals, plastic resins and synthetic fibers industries in March of 1983. The proposed
regulations included effluent limitations and standards based on Best Practicable Control
Technology Currently Available (BPT), Best Available Technology Economically Achievable
(BAT), New Source Performance Standards (NSPS), and Pretreatment Standards for New and
Existing Sources (PSNS and PSES). The regulations were proposed under authority of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended by the Clean Water Act of 1977.
Since the proposed rule, substantial new data collection and analyses have been conducted,
and new standards are being developed. A separate RIA document is being developed for the
final rule. This will include case studies of the benefits of the rule, economic impact studies, and
an environmental assessment of the affected industry. Also, currently being developed are: a
study of the benefits of the rule for the Delaware River, a national water quality benefits estimate
based on the case studies, and a national volatile organic compounds (VOCs) intermedia transfer
study.
Regulatory Alternatives
Unlike other industries for which EPA has established effluent guidelines, the OCPSF
industry is not amenable to the specification of a single model technology. Instead, effluent
limitations will be achieved using some combination of in-plant control, treatment of specific
wastestreams by any of a variety of physical/chemical methods, biological treatment of
combined wastestreams, and post- biological treatment. The regulatory options examined for the
1985 economic impact study include various combinations of these control technologies.
Environmental Effects
Two studies were done in 1985 assessing the environmental impacts of the organic
chemicals, plastics, and synthetic fibers industry (OCPSF). One of these studies covered 81
direct discharging facilities. The other covered 109 indirect discharging facilities. Both used a
simplified dilution water quality model to predict the increase in in-stream pollutant
concentrations resulting from direct or indirect discharges.
Over 60% of the OCPSF direct dischargers using current pollution control practices were
projected to exceed water quality criteria on toxicity levels. This amount was projected to be
reduced by as much as 50% by implementing BAT treatment. While 33% of the pollutants
identified were projected to exceed water quality criteria under current conditions, this number
would be reduced by 66% with BAT treatment.
Over 27% of the indirect dischargers using current pollution control practices were projected
to exceed water quality criteria of toxicity levels. This amount was projected to be reduced by as
much as 70% by implementing PSES treatment. Over 30% of pollutants were projected toh-2
exceed water quality criteria under current conditions, which number would be reduced by over
80% with PSES treatment.
In preparing its analyses of the organic chemicals effluent guidelines, EPA found that
wastewater treatment processes could generate significant emissions of VOCs into the air. As a
result of this finding, new regulatory options that would control this intermedia transfer of
pollutants are now being considered as part of the rulemaking. The benefits of controlling the
intermedia transfer of VOCs into the air are reductions in exposure to carcinogenic and
non-carcinogenic compounds that result in adverse health effects and to VOC-generated ozone
that results in adverse health and welfare effects.
Controlling effluent discharges from the OCPSF industry would have beneficial effects on
human health by reducing the incidences of cancer and other toxic effects of pollutants. It would
also reduce the toxic effects of pollutants on aquatic life.
Benefits
To help demonstrate the benefits of regulation on the OCPSF industry, EPA undertook
studies of the incremental economic benefits of the regulation on specific stream segments. The
stream segments studied in 1983 were (1) the Kanawha River in West Virginia, and (2) the
Houston Ship Channel/Upper Galveston Bay, in Texas. Also, currently in process are: a study of
the benefits of regulation for the Delaware River; a national water quality benefits estimate
based on the case studies; and a national benefits study based on the measurement of VOC
intermedia transfer effects.
The approach for measuring benefits used in the 1983 studies involved estimating present
and potential future benefits from water quality improvements on the case streams. The benefit
categories included recreation benefits, non-user benefits, health benefits, diversionary uses and
commercial fishing benefits. The analytic techniques included direct estimation of the change in
recreational activity on the case streams. Health benefits were not monetized.
For the Kanawha River the total dollar benefits per year were estimated to be in the range of
$2.3 - 9.7 million. These numbers reflected the benefits of moving from current, in-place
treatment to the proposed BAT. The analysis of the Houston Ship Channel was hampered by
lack of data on water quality and recreational activity and by the complexity of the task. The
estimated benefit was less than $1 million annually, but more information might indicate a
greater level of benefits. All estimates were in 1982 dollars.
Costs
Treatment costs for BPT and BAT/PSES were estimated independently in 1985. The major
categories of estimated costs included those for capital equipment, land, operation and
maintenance, sludge treatment and disposal, and compliance monitoring. Costs are estimated on
a plant-by-plant basis. For the BPT and PSES options, the treatment costs are incremental from
the current treatment in-place at the plants. For the BAT options, the costs are incremental toh-3
BPT Option II. Total annualized treatment costs ranged from $131 million (in 1982 dollars) to
$676.8 million.
Regarding the case studies, the total annual costs calculated for the Kanawha river were $5.8
million. The total annual costs for the Houston Ship Channel were estimated to be $25 million.
Benefit-Cost Analysis
For the Kanawha River, the benefits of moving OCPSF facilities from in-place treatment to
proposed BAT were found to be roughly comparable to the costs; for the Houston Ship Channel,
the costs of further treatment would clearly outweigh the nonhealth-related benefits, but
nonmonetized reductions in health risks would be realized with the addition of BPT and BAT
pollution abatement controls.
Distributional Effects
Plants in the OCPSF industry are concentrated in the North Central, Mid Atlantic,
Southeastern, and Southwestern states.
Economic Impact Analysis
In 1985, EPA identified 997 OCPSF establishments in order to conduct an economic impact
analysis of regulation. The primary economic impact variables assessed include the costs of the
contemplated regulations, and the potential for these regulations to cause plant closures, price
changes, unemployment, reductions in profitability, shifts in the balance of trade and
anticompetitive effects on small businesses and new facilities. Across options, the median
decrease in profitability ranged from 7.5% to 33.9%. The median production cost increase
ranged from 0.5% to 2.4%. The median liquidity reduction ranged from 4.8% to 26.6%.
Estimated plant closures ranged from 4 to 20. And plant closures were estimated to result in job
losses ranging from 251 to 9,906.
The BPT and PSES regulatory options are not expected to have foreign trade impacts. BAT
Option II is expected to have a small impact on one chemical group and BAT Option III is
estimated to have a small impact on two chemical groups.
Projected closures are more heavily weighted among small businesses, especially at BPT and
PSES.
Decision
EPA proposed effluent limitations guidelines based on the application of the best practicable
technology, best conventional technology, best available technology, new source performance
standards, and pretreatment standards for existing and new sources. These proposed regulations
apply to wastewater discharges resulting from the manufacture of organic chemicals, plastics and
synthetic fibers. EPA considered the health and ecological effects, economic benefits and costs,h-4
as well as availability and practicability of technology in setting its effluent standards for the
OCPSF industry.
EPA will consider comments received in response to the proposal and to subsequent notices
in setting the final rule.Asbestos
Regulation
Asbestos is a naturally occurring substance applied in a wide variety of industrial uses
because of its desirable properties and because it can be produced at prices competitive with
those of available substitutes. Unfortunately, exposure to asbestos dust has been shown to
increase significantly an individual’s risk of contracting a number of potentially serious diseases.
EPA has determined, according to criteria set down by the Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA) of 1976, that all uses of asbestos should be controlled because asbestos products may
pose an unreasonable risk to human health due to the potential for exposure to asbestos
throughout the life cycle of the products; that is, the mining, milling, manufacturing, processing,
use, and disposal of the asbestos product.
Regulatory Alternatives
This RIA examined 10 regulatory alternatives, which involve either product bans, or fiber
phase-down rules, or combinations of both. Fiber buyers or sellers would be issued permits,
depending on the specific alternative, that would limit the quantity of fiber sold or bought, and
these permits would be transferable. The baseline exposure assumptions ranged across
alternatives from 0.5 fiber/ milliter (f/mL), strictly complied with, to 2.0 f/mL, not always
complied with. (The exposure assumption of 0.2 f/mL was also studied in the rulemaking
process although not included in this RIA.)
Environmental Effects
Reducing asbestos manufacture and use was anticipated to have beneficial effects on human
health, resulting in a significant reduction in incidences of lung cancer and mesothelioma.
The Nicholson relative risk model was used in this RIA to estimate the number of lung
cancer cases avoided due to regulation, and Nicholson’s absolute risk model was used to
estimate the number of mesothelioma cases avoided. The estimates were presented using three
different baseline exposure assumptions:
1. Actual exposures assuming the 2 f/mL standard is in place, but is not always complied
with.
2. Exposures assuming that the 2 f/mL standard is in place and is strictly complied with.
3. Exposures assuming a 0.5 f/mL standard is in place and is strictly complied with.
(Exposures assuming a 0.2 f/mL standard is in place and strictly complied with were also studied
in the rulemaking process, but not included in this RIA.)
Total cancer cases avoided, assuming actual compliance with the 2 f/mL standard, ranged
across alternatives from 2,306 to 4,545. Assuming strict compliance with the 2f/mL standard, the
numbers ranged from 1,632 to 3,441; and assuming strict compliance with the 0.5 f/mL
standard, the numbers ranged from 793 to 1,725.i-2
Benefits
Benefits in this RIA were defined as number of cancer cases avoided due to regulation. (See
above.)
Costs
Three types of regulation costs were projected:
1. Welfare losses incurred by consumers.
2. Welfare losses incurred by owners of capital equipment used to produce asbestos and
asbestos products.
3. Dislocation costs incurred by displaced workers.
Total surplus losses due to regulation ranged across alternatives from $437 million to $2,747
million. These costs are for the period from 1985 2000, discounted at a 10% discount rate.
Worker dislocation costs from plant closings due to product bans total $12.9 million. This cost is
in 1983 constant dollars and would be incurred in 1985.
Benefit-Cost Analysis
A traditional benefit-cost analysis was not performed for this RIA. Instead, a cost
effectiveness analysis was made, which yielded an estimate of the cost per cancer case avoided,
and a comparison of this estimate across regulatory alternatives. The estimates are very sensitive
to the baseline exposure assumptions made. If the assumption is of actual compliance with the
2.0f/mL standard, the cost per cancer case avoided ranges from $137,489 to $607,261; assuming
strict compliance with the 2.0f/mL standard, the costs range from $194, 301 to $502,092; and
assuming strict compliance with the 0.5f/mL standard, the costs range from $432,277 to
$1,600,000. 
Distributional Effects
Under all of the alternatives, the greatest losses would be incurred by domestic secondary
processors and other downstream consumers of asbestos products. However these losses would
be spread out over many companies and consumers. The highest concentration of secondary
processors is in Region V, the Great Lakes area. In contrast, the relatively small losses of
domestic miners and millers would be shared by only three companies, located in Vermont and
California.
Those who would benefit from the regulation of asbestos are those who may be exposed to
asbestos, both in occupational and nonoccupational settings. Occupational exposures occur
during the mining and milling of asbestos and in the manufacture, installation, repair, and
disposal of the asbestos products or among those using the products at work. Nonoccupationali-3
exposure may occur among persons living or working close to the asbestos product
manufacturing site or close to a site where the asbestos product is used or discarded.
Nonoccupational exposure also includes consumers of automobiles and housing in every state.
The effects of U.S. regulation of the market will also be felt abroad; as Canada is the most
important source and importer of U.S. asbestos, it would be the country most affected by the
product bans and fiber cap.
Economic Impact Analysis
Most capital equipment used to produce asbestos products can be converted fairly easily to
produce other products often substitutes for the asbestos products.
Projected market adjustments due to the ban (of roofing felt, flooring felt and felt-backed
vinyl flooring, V/A floor tile, A/C pipe, and asbestos cloth used to make protective clothing),
which is included in all the alternatives except Alternative 10, include a 32.9% reduction in
asbestos fiber price and a 48% reduction in equilibrium output of asbestos fiber. Prices of certain
unbanned asbestos products would decline by more than 10%, inducing equilibrium demand
increases by 25% or more.
All regulatory alternatives except Alternative 1 involved the imposition of an asbestos fiber
phase-down rule beginning in 1985, accompanied or unaccompanied by a products ban. Under
these conditions, the price was projected to increase for Alternatives 2 and 3 from $557 per ton
in 1985 to $6,624 per ton in 2000; for Alternatives 4-7, the price would increase from $557 in
1985 to $8,684 in 1994; for Alternatives 8 and 9, the price would increase from $557 in 1985 to
$6,246 in 1989; and for Alternative 10, the price would increase from $601 in 1985 to $5,809 in
2000.
 Only 27 small primary processors (out of a total of 212 firms) would experience producer
surplus losses under the proposed regulation, and their losses would be approximately 10% of
total producer surplus losses of domestic companies.
Decision
As a result of its review of the health effects associated with asbestos and the economic
consequences of asbestos regulation, EPA is proposing to prohibit the manufacture, importation,
and processing of seven asbestos products and to phase out the use of asbestos in all other
products by 1995. Eventually, all mining or importation of asbestos would be prohibited, except
for that mining or importation allowed under an exemption process.
EPA is requesting comments on an alternative rule, which would ban the manufacture,
importation and processing of asbestos at staged intervals. EPA is also requesting comments on
the feasibility and effectiveness of labeling all asbestos products that are not banned.PCB Transformers
Regulation
Section 6(e) of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) bans the continued use of
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), except for certain specifically authorized uses and for totally
enclosed uses. EPA issued the Electrical Use Rule in 1982 allowing the continued use of PCBs
in most electrical equipment (considered an “enclosed use”) during the remainder of the
equipment’s useful life, but requiring quarterly inspections of the transformers, and phasing out
the use of certain other transformers. This rule focused on the exposure risk posed by PCBs
resulting from leaks or spills of PCB-containing dielectric fluid from electrical equipment.
However, as a result of several incidents involving PCB transformers, EPA proposed another
rule dealing specifically with PCB transformers located in or near buildings where fires or
electrical malfunctions could pose substantial risk to human health or the environment as a result
of exposure to PCBs or PCB oxidation productions.
Regulatory Alternatives
Regulatory alternatives to the current authorized use of indoor PCB transformers included: 
1. Accelerated phase out/replacement of indoor PCB transformers (over 5 years).
2. Accelerated phase out (over 10 years).
3. Retrofill of existing PCB-askarel filled transformers with alternative fluids.
4. Additional electrical protection.
Environmental Effects
Additional control of PCB-containing electrical transformers would substantially reduce the
adverse affects to human health and the environment caused by exposure to PCBs following a
catastrophic fire or explosion.
Benefits
Two measures of benefits due to regulation were derived in this RIA:
1. The reduction in catastrophic events resulting from PCB transformer fires or failure;
and
2. The dollar savings resulting from avoided clean-up costs.
For purposes of analysis, catastrophic events were assumed to cost $20 million to clean up.
The costs focused on in this analysis were the incremental costs incurred as a result of a fire or a
failure being associated with a PCB transformer. Because fire risk is not uniform across
transformer types, calculations of both benefits and costs of regulation were made separately for
3 types of transformers. The savings associated with regulation are based on the reduction in
incidences of catastrophic events calculated under each alternative. For 480Y/277 Spot Networkj-2
transformers, the total number of catastrophic events avoided ranged across alternatives from
21.2 to 29.7, and the total clean-up cost avoided ranged from $123.2 million to $234.3 million;
for 208Y/120 Grid Network transformers, the number of events avoided ranged from 2.8 to 4.2
and costs avoided ranged from $16.7 million to $35.1 million; for 480Y/ 277 Radial
Transformers, the number of events avoided ranged from 8.8 to 12.8, and costs avoided ranged
from $53 million to $106.7 million. All dollar measures reflect 1985 present value using a
10% discount rate.
Costs
The costs of regulation were defined as the incremental costs of implementing a given
regulatory option, including direct labor, capital, and registration costs, as well as any changes in
transformer operating costs. For 480Y/277 Spot Networks, the total real resource costs ranged
across alternatives from $121.1 million to $173.3 million; for 208Y/120 Grid Networks, the
costs ranged from $36.8 million to $286.2 million; for 480Y/277 Radial Transformers, costs
ranged from $554.6 million to $1,205.2 million. The cost measures reflect present value and use
a 10% discount rate.
Benefit-Cost Analysis
In this RIA, the only benefits monetized were the clean up costs avoided. For each
alternative the net cost was defined as the incremental cost of regulation minus incremental clean
up costs avoided. A ratio of net cost to expected number of events avoided was then calculated,
yielding a cost per expected event avoided. Regulation of 480Y/277 Spot Networks produces a
net gain to society: that is, the avoided clean-up costs exceed the costs of regulation. Total
benefits ranged across alternatives from $2.1 million to $41.3 million. For the other source
categories the costs of regulation exceeded the clean up costs avoided. For 208Y/120 Grid
Networks, total net costs ranged from $11 million to $266 million, with associated cost
effectiveness ranging from $3 million to $74 million per avoided event. For 480Y/277 Radial
transformers, total net costs ranged from $500 million to $1.098 billion, and cost effectiveness
ranged from $47 million to $86 million per avoided event.
Distributional Effects
The costs of regulation will be borne by owners of PCB-containing transformers. Of an
estimated 104,284 indoor PCB transformers, 17.5% are owned by electric utilities. Owners of
the remaining transformers in service at the end of 1984 include public (5%), commercial
(52%), and industrial (26%) building owners. However, as a result of variations in transformer
characteristics, the distribution of regulatory costs among ownership segments is not
proportional to the number of transformers owned. Large commercial building owners and
public utilities were expected to bear the highest regulatory costs – $355.4 million and $177.l
million, respectively.j-3
Economic Impact Analysis
One major commercial ownership group, real estate development companies, participates in
one of the economy’s most competitive markets and therefore is not likely to pass on a
significant portion of these costs to tenants. Because of the pressure of Public Utility
Commissions, public utilities will not be able to pass on regulatory costs either.
In this RIA, measures of economic impact on individual companies were determined. These
measures demonstrated that customer and shareholder impacts are likely to be less than 1 percent
in all cases, except for small, localized PCB transformer owners. For these owners, impacts
could potentially reach several percent, with cash flow impacts likely to be the most significant.
Decision
The Final Rule regarding PCB transformers prohibits the use of 480Y/227 Spot Network
transformers in or near commercial buildings after 1 October 1990, requires enhanced electrical
protection on 208Y/120 Grid networks and 480Y/227 Radial transformers by 1 October 1990,
prohibits the installation of PCB transformers in or near commercial buildings after 1 October
1985, requires the registration of all PCB transformers with fire response personnel and building
owners by 1 December 1985, requires the marking of the exterior of all PCB transformer
locations by 1 December 1985, and requires the removal of stored combustibles located near
PCB transformers by 1 December 1985. The net costs of this rule were estimated to be $390
million; the average cost effectiveness of the Rule was estimated to be $11 million per avoided
event.
 TSCA requires that, in issuing rulemaking under TSCA’s authority, EPA must consider
health and environmental effects as well as economic consequences. The benefits and costs of
the regulatory options discussed in this RIA contributed to the final regulatory decision on PCB
transformers.Premanufacture Review
Regulation
Section 5(a)(1)(A) of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) requires manufacturers and
importers of new substances to provide EPA with notice of their intent to manufacture or import
such substances at least 90 days prior to when actual manufacturing or import begins. Although
TSCA does not require that premanufacture notice (PMN) requirements and processes be stated
in a rule, EPA determined that the issuance of a procedural/interpretive rule and a form was in
the best interest of all concerned parties. The form was to be set up to determine whether the
commercial introduction of newly developed substances would present an unreasonable risk to
human health or the environment.
Regulatory Alternatives
Three alternative forms for the premanufacture notice were considered initially in this
analysis. As a result of analysis in support of this study, a fourth form was developed. The four
forms were differentiated by the scope of the information requested:
  1. EPA 79 form (an interim proposal developed by EPA in 1979) would require
submitters to provide the most information. It would require more detailed production
and marketing data, explanation of physical and chemical properties and exposure,
release, and disposal data, than the other forms would.
  2. CMA 79 Form: The Chemical Manufacturers Association developed a proposed PMN
form based on the principle that Section 5(d) of TSCA provides an all-inclusive list of
the information that a PMN is to contain. This form would make the provision of risk
assessment and exposure and release information optional.
  3. EPA 82 Form would require the submitter’s identity; the chemical name of the
substance; its identity and molecular structure; production and marketing data; flow
diagram; and worker exposure, release and disposal estimates.
  4. Final Form: This form is very similar to the EPA 82 form, except that it adds
information about worker activity exposure, general information about sites controlled
by others, and clarifies other sections.
Environmental Effects
Use of the different chemical reporting forms would result in a greater or lesser probability
of prevention of adverse health and environmental effects resulting from exposure to toxic
substances. In a study of five cases of previously reviewed PMNs where use of a different form
might have resulted in a different regulatory action, uncertainties concerning dose response
relationships made quantitative assessments of risk reduction difficult; and the small number of
cases studied is not a statistically valid sample of the potential health benefits of each form. It
was assumed that the major health benefits from regulation would occur as the result of
regulation acting as a deterrent, that is resulting in the introduction of less hazardous chemicals
than would otherwise have been introduced.k-2
Benefits
Benefits were not quantified for this RIA. Benefits of the alternative forms are primarily the
health benefits that result from having sufficient information to make correct decisions. The
Office of Toxic Substances in EPA conducted a study of PMN cases to determine whether use of
any of the three alternatives other than the final would not have identified the PMN substances
for Agency action. The results of this study suggest that the EPA 79 form is more likely to
provide sufficient information for regulatory decisions in marginal cases than either the EPA 82
or CMA 79 forms. However, the probability of EPA identifying a problem substance is not
significantly lower with the forms other than EPA 79; thus the incremental benefits of the
lengthier form are small. 
Costs
Following are the costs which firms will incur in complying with Section 5 requirements:
1. Direct filing costs.
2. Confidentiality: If the firm claims the data contained in a PMN are confidential, the
costs increase.
3. Delay costs: The reduction in the present value of the retrofit stream for the new
chemical because of delayed introduction into commerce.
4. Cost of voluntary actions taken by firms during the PMN review to reduce possible
health hazards; these actions are taken to forestall EPA from placing restrictions on
production of the chemical.
Total industry costs per year in 1981 dollars, assuming 900 new substances per year, ranged
across alternatives from $4.8 - 11.4 million, for the EPA 82 Form, to $6.9 - 20.6 million, for the
EPA 79 Form. (Annual costs for the Final Form were estimated to be $5.2 - $13 million.) EPA
review costs for all alternatives were $7.0 million. Total costs for the Final Form were $12.2 -
20 million.
Benefit-Cost Analysis
A traditional benefit-cost analysis was not performed in this RIA.
Distributional Effects
Distributional effects of regulation were not discussed in this RIA.
Economic Impact Analysis
Based on data from industry commissioned surveys and data in PMN files, it appears that
since the PMN program became effective, there has been no significant change in the number of
new substances introduced by the largest companies, though there might have been a declinek-3
from small companies. This decline reduces total industry profits from new substances by less
than 5 percent.
Regulatory costs to firms with less than $30 million in annual sales represent less than 1% of
sales for these companies and be- tween 0.9 and 2.1% of their profits. For firms under $100
million in annual sales, costs represent less than 0.1% of sales and 0.3 - 0.6% of profits. The
exemption rules are expected to result in a savings of 11 to 35% for small firms.
Decision
In January, 1979, EPA proposed a rule and forms to implement the TSCA Section 5 notice
requirements; the rule and forms were re-proposed in part in October 1979, and supplemented by
a processor reporting proposal in August 1980 and a clarification of importer reporting
requirements in September 1980. In May 1983, EPA issued a final rule and notice form. The
notice requirements and procedures established in this rule replaced the Interim Policy under
which EPA had been conducting the new chemical notice review program since it began on July
1, 1979.
Although this rule will not have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more,
EPA based its classification of the rule as “major” on various studies conducted on the costs of
compliance with Section 5 notice requirements and the effect of these requirements on new
chemical innovation.
Along with considerations of health effects, EPA considered the economic effects of
regulation in promulgating this rule.Management of Used Oil
Regulation
EPA has tentatively determined that used oil typically and frequently contains significant
quantities of lead and other metals, chlorinated solvents, toluene, and naphthalene. Improper
management of used oil would pose a substantial hazard to human health and the environment.
EPA is proposing to control the management of used oil in order to reduce these risks.
Passage of the Used Oil Recycling Act (UORA), codified as Section 3014 of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), and Amendments to Section 3014 in the Hazardous
and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 have given EPA the specific mandate to regulate used oil
recycling. In setting the regulation, EPA considered its costs as well as its health and welfare
effects.
Regulatory Alternatives
In making its decision to propose these rules, EPA evaluated in the RIA four regulatory
alternatives.. These alternatives include administrative standards, today’s listing and
management standards, and upcoming standards on used oil combustion devices.
Alternative 1 is the imposition of full hazardous waste standards as previously promulgated.
The remaining three alternatives control the flow of used oil with a limited set of regulations less
stringent than those presently applied to hazardous wastes. The alternatives also vary by the
limits on lead content set in the fuel specification. In alternatives 1 and 2, the lead standard is
established at 100 parts per million (ppm). In the last two alternatives, the lead standard is set at
50 and 10ppm.
Environmental Effects
Used oil contaminants can be transported through the air as well as through surface and ground
water. The nature of the effects of used oil contaminants is as broad as the range of types of
these contaminants themselves. Many of the organic contaminants are known human
carcinogens, as are several of the inorganic contaminants. Other inorganic materials (e.g., lead)
are known to cause brain and renal damage, (The RIA quantitatively evaluates only
carcinogens.)
Potential exposure estimates were translated in the RIA into cancer risk estimates using
traditional linear dose-response functions and then aggregated nationwide.
Benefits
Benefits were not monetized for this RIA; instead, they were represented by reductions in
potential cancer risks from exposure to used oil contaminants. The reduction from the baseline
that would be achieved by regulation ranged across alternatives from 60 to 67 percent. Neither
non-cancer effects nor ecological effects were quantified in the RIA.l-2
Costs
The costs of regulation would include incremental costs for storage controls, administrative
requirements, tracking used oil from its point of collection to end use, and testing controls. They
would also include costs of controlling the burning and disposal of used oil. These costs were
estimated in this RIA for each facility, then aggregated nationwide. Total annual compliance
costs ranged from $167 million for the proposed alternative to $525 million for the full
hazardous waste standards. 
Benefit-Cost Analysis
A traditional benefit-cost analysis was not made in this RIA: instead a comparative
cost-effectiveness ratio was determined for each alternative, attained by dividing total annual
costs by the number of potential cancer cases avoided (adjusted to a per-year basis).
Cost-effectiveness ratios ranged from $1.29 million per potential cancer case avoided to $4.12
million. (However, since these calculations are based on the use of relative risk reductions rather
than absolute risk reductions, these dollar values are likely to be underestimates of the
cost-per-cancer-case avoided. As such, this cost-effectiveness measure should be taken only as a
basis of comparison among regulations and not as an indication of absolute cost-effectiveness.) 
Distributional Effects
Costs of regulation would accrue to the following groups: generators of used oil, collectors
and processing facilities, and end-users of used oil, such as asphalt plants and commercial
road-oiling services. Small and medium-sized collectors would be likely to suffer the most under
regulation.
Economic Impact Analysis
In order to estimate the economic impact of the alternative regulations on industries that buy
and sell used oil, EPA developed a financial profile of model facilities based on income
statements and projected cash flows, and estimated the value of the facilities after regulatory
costs and associated price changes took place. This analysis showed that costs incurred by the
proposed regulation would cause facilities to raise the prices at which used oil is purchased and
sold, contributing to the closing of approximately 473 of 700 collector facilities. Most of these
closures would be small facilities, and many of these would be replaced by expanded large
facilities. Re-refiners and fuel processors were expected to profit from regulation and produce
larger volumes of recycled used oil products. 
Decision
As a result of its review of the health and welfare criteria associated with used oil, as well as
of its analysis of the cost-effectiveness of the regulatory alternatives, EPA proposed Alternative
2 in regulating generators and transporters of recycled oil, and owners and operators of used oil
recycling facilities. The standards included tracking requirements when used oil is shippedl-3
off-site for recycling, and facility management requirements when used oil is stored prior to
recycling. Because the RIA found that the cost of the full hazardous waste standards could lead
to increased dumping of used oil by some segments of the regulated community, Alternative 2
included different standards for small, medium, and large generators and reduced standards for
some used oil transporters. Recycled oil used as fuel was subject to certain regulations; the lead
content in the fuel specification was established at 100 ppm. Disposal of recycled oil was
regulated, and road oiling was prohibited outright.
The Administrator invited comments from the public for consideration in promulgating the
standards. The concern about increased dumping and reduced recycling, raised in the RIA, was
expressed by a great many commenters. Subsequently, EPA announced that it would not list
used oil bound for recycling as a hazardous waste and would reconsider its options for regulating
used oil bound for disposal.Land Disposal of Hazardous Wastes
Regulation
The 1984 Amendments to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) prohibit the
land disposal of all listed hazardous wastes by specified dates unless EPA determines through a
site-specific petition process that continued land disposal of these wastes is protective of human
health and the environment, or unless wastes comply with treatment standards to be established
by EPA. EPA has proposed a regulatory framework for specifying treatment standards for land
disposed wastes. These standards include screening levels that would result in no significant
health hazard to persons exposed to releases of hazardous constituents from land disposal units,
and Best Demonstrated Available Technology (BDAT) standards in cases where no technology
can achieve the screening level but the BDAT substantially reduces toxicity.
Regulatory Alternatives
Alternative 1 does not provide for the development of a screening level but instead relies
entirely on technology-based standards and the petition process.
Under Alternative 2, EPA would take no action to determine if continued land disposal of
the affected hazardous waste is protective of human health and the environment. As a result,
land disposal of these hazardous wastes would be banned after a certain date, under the RCRA
Amendments’ hammer provisions.
Under Alternative 3, the Agency would not ban land disposal of the affected hazardous
wastes. Instead, EPA would require (1) treatment of contaminated drinking water prior to use, or
(2) corrective action to clean up a contaminated aquifer.
In this RIA, only the Agency’s proposed regulatory framework was analyzed.
Environmental Effects
Controlling land disposal of toxic materials will have beneficial effects both on human health
and the physical environment.
Benefits
 In this RIA, benefits were expressed in terms of number of health risk reductions and
percentage reduction from current risks achieved by land disposal restrictions. This analysis
derived human health risk distributions for each combination of waste and type of treatment
technology. The percentage reduction from current risks attained by the proposed regulation was
estimated to be approximately 60%.
Costs
To calculate the incremental costs incurred by society as a result of the proposed land
disposal restrictions, this RIA first estimated the current costs of land disposing hazardousm-2
wastes, then identified the minimum cost treatment alternative to land disposal. The difference
between the costs of baseline land disposal and the minimum cost treatment alternative, summed
across the estimated number of facilities nationally, represents the social cost of the regulation.
Total social costs of restricting all hazardous wastes from land disposal were predicted to be
approximately $1.3 billion per year, including wastes managed at commercial facilities,
noncommercial facilities, and small quantity generators.
Benefit-Cost Analysis
Benefits and costs were not compared in this RIA.
Distributional Effects
Distributional effects of regulation were not discussed in this RIA.
Economic Impact Analysis
 In the economic impact analysis, the increased costs of complying with the proposed
regulation were compared to the overall cash flow and production costs of firms in the affected
industries to determine the implications of the regulation for the economic sectors generating
and disposing of hazardous wastes.
All of the significantly impacted non-commercial facilities (175) would experience potential
reductions in cash from operations (CFO) of greater than 5%. Seventy-one of these facilities
would also experience potential increases of greater than 5% in cost of production (COP). The
remaining significantly affected facilities, and all of the 238 less severely impacted facilities,
could pass on to their customers the full cost of regulatory compliance via a product price
increase of less than 5%. 
 Commercial facilities were divided into two types, one which primarily land disposes wastes
while the other provides a range of treatment and disposal alternatives. Among the facilities that
provide solely land disposal services, 7 facilities would incur significant revenue loss (a total
ranging from $144,000 to $29 million) if RCRA waste handling was shifted to the more
technologically diverse firms. These land disposal firms would have to enter a different market,
one in which they may have limited competitive advantage. The other land disposal oriented
firms rely upon RCRA waste handling for 9% or less of their revenue. Technologically diverse
firms, on the other hand, would benefit from both the elimination of low-priced competitive
treatment and disposal practices and the probable increase in quantity of waste shipped to them.
The economic impact of RCRA waste land disposal restriction on small quantity generators
was not significant.
Eighty-four of the 175 significantly impacted noncommercial facilities were small
businesses. The sections most affected would be Primary Metals (with 30% increase in COP and
823% reduction in CFO), Lumber and Wood Products (total compliance costs of $303,988), and
Petroleum Refining.m-3
Decision
January 1986’s rule restricting land disposal of hazardous wastes proposes procedures to
establish treatment standards for hazardous wastes, to grant nationwide variances from statutory
effective dates, to grant extensions on effective dates on a case-by-case basis, and procedures by
which EPA will evaluate petitions demonstrating that continued land disposal is protective of
human health and the environment. In addition, this rule prohibits land disposal of certain
dioxin- or solvent-containing wastes unless the treatment standards are achieved. This rule was
based on considerations of health effects and economic impacts of regulation, and partially on
BDAT.
EPA has determined that the regulation of land disposal of solvents and dioxins will not
constitute a major rule as defined by Executive Order 12291. However, this and other RIAs were
prepared in support of this proposal, in recognition of the scope of the regulatory framework of
which restrictions on land disposal of solvent and dioxin wastes are only a part, and of total costs
of applying this regulatory framework to all land disposed wastes regulated under RCRA, which
will exceed the $100 million that defines a major rule.
In the Federal Register notice of the proposal, EPA invited comments from the public for
consideration in promulgating the standards.National Oil and Hazardous Substances 
Pollution Contingency Plan
Regulation
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),
enacted in 1980, provides the authority and funding for the President to take removal and
remedial actions when hazardous substances have been released or there is a substantial threat of
their release into the environment. Section 105 of CERCLA requires revision of the mechanism
established in 1973 under the authority of the Clean Water Act (CWA) for coordinating response
to specified environmental emergencies, the National Contingency Plan (NCP), to reflect the
new authorities of CERCLA. CERCLA provides that actions taken in response to releases of
hazardous substances shall, to the extent practicable, be in accordance with the revised NCP.
CERCLA requires that the Plan define methods for investigating facilities, methods for
remedying releases, appropriate roles for government and industry, provisions for procurement
of response equipment, methods for determining cost-effective remedial actions, methods for
setting up national priorities among sites, and other factors.
In developing these revisions, considerations of costs as well as engineering feasibility,
environmental, welfare and public health effectiveness were made in choosing among alternative
regulatory options; however, monetized benefits were not considered.
Regulatory Alternatives
Two regulatory alternatives were evaluated. Each alternative reflected a different
formulation of the goals and scope of the NCP revisions and a substantially different method of
allocating the Superfund:
1. Alternative 1 characterizes the objectives of the NCP revisions as the protection of
public health, welfare, and the environment, with the emphasis on public health
concerns.
2. Alternative 2 gives greater emphasis to public welfare and the environment, thereby
increasing the likely costs of response at each individual site.
EPA proposed Alternative 1 as the preferred option.
Environmental Effects
Anticipated health benefits from regulating the disposal of hazardous substances included
health benefits from:
1. Stemming the contamination of groundwater sources supplying water for human
consumption (the analysis showed that Alternative 1 would reduce the population at
risk of exposure to contaminated groundwater by about 4.9 million, compared to 4.4
million under Alternative 2); 
2. Stemming the spread of hazardous chemicals through the air due to corrosion or
rupture of contaminant vessels, fire or violent chemical reactions; andn-2
3. Reducing the risk to populations due to soil and surface water contamination.
All of the above imply environmental benefits, which were not quantified in this RIA.
Benefits
No monetized benefits were calculated for this RIA.
Costs
Under the two regulatory alternatives, there are no expected differences in the number and
cost of removal actions, but there are differences in the projected number of remedial actions,
which form the core of the Superfund site cleanup program. And the most important difference
between the two alternatives is the estimated cost of a remedial action under each alternative.
In the narrower, preferred option, 170 remedial actions were planned, at an average cost over
a seven-year period (1981-87), of $4.5 million per remedial action, with a total cost of $765
million. In Alternative 2, the costs per remedial action were increased by 50% to an average cost
of $6.75 million with 115 of these more extensive remedial actions, yielding a total cost of $776
million.
Benefit-Cost Analysis
No benefit-cost analysis was performed in this RIA.
Distributional Effects
As a result of the regulation, industry will incur costs:
1. As a result of EPA enforcement actions;
2. When costs are recovered from industry after federal response action has been
performed; and
3. As a result of privately financed responses induced by provisions of the NCP.
Disposers and chemical producers are likely to bear the largest portion of costs of removals
and remedial actions. The cost burden does not fall on these industries as a whole, however, but
on individual firms as a result of specific enforcement and cost recovery actions.
Benefits affect those private contractors hired in connection with removal and remedial
actions, mainly construction firms. As the risk of exposure to hazardous substances is reduced,
public welfare benefits increase. For example, property prices may recover from depression due
to proximity to a site, public parks nearby would become accessible again. Communities may
revive, benefitting the local tax base.n-3
States and localities affected by the action will accrue both costs and benefits as a result of it.
The NCP revisions will establish a list of at least 400 priority sites for remedial action; CERCLA
stipulates that the one hundred top priority sites include at least one site from each state “to the
extent practicable.”
Economic Impact Analysis
Costs of remedial actions are balanced by pecuniary benefits to firms, mainly construction
firms, that are contracted during a hazardous waste cleanup and a societal redistribution of
resources.
The additional costs to generators, disposers, and transporters of hazardous wastes will
increase their production costs, resulting initially in a combination of output declines and price
increases. It is unclear what will be the magnitude of these effects or whether they will persist.
The real resource costs (as these costs are called) of the revised NCP were found to be small:
upper bound estimates of the decline in output by the chemical industry would be around 0.1%,
and of an increase in prices would be about 0.2%.
Although the analysis indicated that an effect could be felt by some individual firms and
states, the total impact of the revised NCP would be negligible. Even if all costs attributed
directly and indirectly to the revised NCP are passed through to consumers (which is unlikely),
the estimated increase in the consumer price index will be less than 0.02%. Output and
employment effects are small and are not expected to persist in the long run.
A small initial price increase in the hazardous waste cleanup industry will not have
economy-wide effects; the greatest impact of a more significant price increase would be that
there could be less cleanup because the cost of cleanup would be higher.
For some states, the potential costs are high because of the extent of their hazardous waste
problem. The costs borne by a state for a cleanup where federal funds are used for remedial
actions is 10% of costs for privately owned sites and at least 50% of costs for sites owned by
state or local governments. Other costs would include institutional and administrative costs
associated with establishing a framework in the states for operating under CERCLA, operation
and maintenance costs after the Superfund tax expired in 1985, and the possible effect of adverse
publicity on reducing state tax bases and increasing unemployment.
Regarding small business entities, it is unlikely that a high percentage of these firms are at
risk from potential enforcement actions because they tend to produce much smaller quantities of
waste than large firms. Also, EPA is allowed discretion whether or not to proceed with
enforcement actions against small businesses.
Decision
Pursuant to Section 105 of CERCLA and Executive Order 12316, EPA promulgated
revisions to the National Contingency Plan for oil and hazardous substances. The revised NCP is
applicable to response actions taken pursuant to CERCLA and Section 311 of the Clean Water
Act.n-4
The Agency invited public comments and incorporated suggested changes in the proposed
revisions where appropriate.Data Requirements for Pesticide Registration
Regulation
EPA, through its Office of Pesticide Programs (OPP), is charged with the responsibility for
regulating pesticide use in the United States. The legal authority for regulating pesticides is
established by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, as Amended (FIFRA).
The Act requires all pesticides to be registered with EPA and further requires EPA to make a
finding that if a pesticide is registered, its use in accordance with widespread and commonly
recognized practices will not generally cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.
Section 3(c)(2) of FIFRA requires that EPA publish guidelines specifying the kinds of
information required to support the registration of a pesticide.
The benefits and costs of alternative regulations were included among the considerations
made in setting the final standard.
Regulatory Alternatives
The Agency considered five alternatives to information generation that supports registration:
1. Reference guidelines: Rulemaking on data submittal requirements would not be
issued.
2. Regulation Requirements: The Agency would issue regulations on data submittal
requirements for the different types of pesticide products and uses to be registered.
Waivers would be permitted and tiered testing approaches specified where
appropriate.
3. Self-Certification: Applicants would certify their products would not cause
unreasonable adverse effects.
4. Comprehensive Data Requirements: The Agency would issue regulations specifying a
list of all data requirements that products must fulfill to obtain registration. Waivers
and tiered testing are not considered in this approach.
5. Provisional Registration: Registrants would be allowed to market their products on a
limited basis after having submitted results from “indicator studies,” which are short-
term and relatively low-cost. Full marketing rights would be granted only after all
studies, including chronic effects tests, are submitted.
EPA decided to propose Alternative 2.
Environmental Effects
Pesticides by design are toxic to living organisms. Nontarget species including humans may
suffer acute toxic effects from exposure to pesticides.
Pesticides may also produce general types of chronic health effects, although data are limited
with regard to the actual extent of pesticide-induced carcinogenicity, teratogenicity, reproductive
effects, and mutagenicity. The pesticide registration alternatives will have an effect in detectingo-2
and avoiding these health effects, ranging from comprehensive requirements, being most
effective, to self-certification, being one-fifth as effective.
Ecological effects of pesticides are reduced by the current program, and could be reduced
further under Alternatives 2 and 4. Major problems would be likely under Alternative 3.
Benefits
Benefits were not monetized for this RIA. Relatively few factors in this analysis were
capable of being quantified or monetized. In order to bring the results of the analysis into “net
benefit terms,” a “benefit rating technique” was developed, taking into account the relative
importance of various factors or criteria to the management of the program and developing
relative ratings of the benefits of the alternative rulings. Benefit factors included pesticide
program benefits, health effects, and environmental effects. The benefit ratings ranged from a
low of 10 for the self-certification alternative to a high of 25 for comprehensive requirements.
Costs
Costs of the alternative regulatory options were composed mainly of industry compliance
costs and agency program costs. The calculation of direct compliance involved mainly
estimation of unit costs of individual studies and estimation of the number of studies expected to
be required on an annual or other time-period basis. Total (direct and indirect) compliance costs
ranged from $103 million/yr. (in 1980/81 prices) to $141 million/yr. Program costs ranged from
$58 million/yr. to $65.5 million/yr.
Benefit-Cost Analysis
No traditional benefit-cost analysis was calculated in this RIA. Instead, costs were rated as
well as benefits, and a benefit/ cost rating ratio was calculated for each alternative. This ratio
ranged from a low of .64 for self-certification to a high of l.21 for the regulatory requirements
alternative.
Distributional Effects
Distributional effects of regulation were not discussed in this RIA.
Economic Impact Analysis
Whereas a substantial portion of increased pesticide costs would be passed on to final
consumers in the agricultural sector, in the non-agricultural sector, most of the increased costs
would be absorbed either by the pesticide manufacturers or the users of pesticides in the
production of other goods and services for sale to final consumers. In either case, net economic
impacts would be quite nominal in relation to the size of these sectors.o-3
None of the alternatives would be capable of generating significant economic impacts on
macroeconomic variables such as employment, inflation or balance of payments.
The Agency’s proposal to implement the regulatory requirements option rather than to
maintain the current program would not produce a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities.
Decision
As a result of its review of the health and ecological benefits associated with data
requirements for pesticide registration, as well as of a consideration of program and compliance
costs of regulatory action, EPA chose to promulgate the regulatory requirements option
(Alternative 2). Waivers would be permitted under this alternative and tiered testing approaches
specified where appropriate.
EPA requested and considered public comments on the proposed rule and revised the rule
accordingly.